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There is no dark side of the moon.
(Pink Floyd)
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Evolution of a Global Internet
The Internet's growth over the last years has been large and dra-
matic.2 An American idea that began in 1969 as an obscure military ex-
periment, the Internet is now becoming a global community. The first in-
ternational connections from the United States were established to England
and Norway in 1973. 3 By the end of 1995, more than 4.5 out of 6.6 million
hosts were located in North America, with the rest spread out among con-
nected networks in about one hundred other countries.4 The portion of the
Internet outside North America is meanwhile growing at an accelerated
speed.5 It now reaches 60 million users in 160 countries, with the number
6doubling each year. The number of domains rose from 120,000 to 488,000
7from 1995 to 1996. European users are expected to double every year,
reaching 100 million in 2001." Internet users in Asia currently number 3
million, and the total is expected to reach 25 million to 30 million by the
1. PINK FLOYD, Eclipse, on DARK SIDE OF THE MOON (Capital Records 1973).
2. Mark Lottor's Domain Survey, which counts the overall number of registered host
computers connected to the Net, found 1.8 million hosts in July 1993. From July 1994 to
July 1995, the number of hosts counted rose from 3.2 million to 6.6 million. In 1996 the
number jumped to 12.8 million, and in 1997 the number of host computers connected to the
Net reached 19.5 million. Mark Lottor, Internet Domain Survey (July, 1997)
<http:/www.nw.comlzonefWWW/top.html>; see also Andrew Kantor & Michael
Neubarth, Off the Charts: The Internet 1996, INTER=ET WORLD, Dec. 1996, at 44, 46. By
the end of the decade, 120 million machines will be connected to the Net, according to the
Internet Society of Reston, Virginia. No one knows exactly how many people use the Inter-
net. Claims that 20 million to 40 million people are connected to the Internet stem, in most
cases, from Lottor's survey. They are based on a rough rule of thumb guessing the number
of users of a connected host. International Data Corp. in Framingham, Massachusetts, for
example, estimates that by the end of the decade, 200 million users will join the Net.
Cynthia Bournellis, Internet '95, INTERNEr WORLD, Nov. 1995, at 47, 47.
3. Michael Neubarth, The Internet: A Global Look, IgrERNET WORLD, Nov. 1995, at
95, 95.
4. Bournellis, supra note 2, at 47.
5. Neubarth, supra note 3, at 95.
6. Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet: Communication from the European
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions (visited Oct. 23, 1997)
<http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/interet/content/communic.html> [hereinafter Illegal and
Harmful Content on the Internet].
7. Kantor & Neubarth, supra note 2, at 46.
8. Brent Gregston, The European Picture: The Net is Conquering the Old World,
INTERNErT WORLD, Dec. 1996, at 52, 52.
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end of the decade.9 Meanwhile, even Mongolian herdsmen can go into li-
braries where the Internet is accessible through a combination of digital
radios and satellite links. And North Korea, one of the world's most se-
cretive societies, recently began publishing English reports on the Inter-
net." While the vision of a global Internet community has a great deal to
offer, different legal, cultural, political, and economical sensitivities must
be faced. In particular, jurisdictional questions have become increasingly
complex with the explosion in Internet usage and technology. Some courts
and enforcement agencies in America advocate broad exercises of juris-
diction. As countries with stricter laws choose to adopt this approach,
however, American citizens may find they are facing the blade of a dou-
ble-edged sword. 3
B. The Regulation of Cyberspace
The rapid growth of the group known as "cyberspace"'' 4 users will be
accompanied by a growth of regulation. As long as cyberspace was a play-
ground for a small fraction of highly educated people, paid for by large in-
9. Gene Mesher, The Internet in Asia: Modem Countries Move Ahead, INTERNET
WORLD, Dec. 1996, at 56, 56; see also Steven Schwankert, Dragons at the Gates, INTERNET
WORLD, Nov. 1995, at 109. Despite China's population of 1.2 billion, it has only 30,000
Internet users. China: The Giant Infant: China and the Internet, INTERNET WORLD ONLINE
(Dec. 1996) <http://www.internetworld.com/l1996l12/china/shtml>.
10. Message from Dave Hughes to Cyber-Rights (Sept. 7, 1997) (available at Cyber-
Rights Library)
<http:llsnyside.sunnyside.comlcpsrllists/.. /970109.crTheNet comes toUlaanBator>.
11. Pyongyang Home Page: Mad Dogs @ www, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, at A10;
see also Saddam Hussein Opens Home Page on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at
D6.
12. See Howard W. French, On the Internet, Most of Africa Is Getting off to a Slow
Start, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A5; William Wresch, New Lifelines: The Net is
Sprouting in Africa-and Aiding Countries with Phone Systems, INTERNET WORLD, Nov.
1995, at 102. A weekly compilation of international Internet events, Netacross the World, is
posted by Madanmohan Rao, Communications Director for the United Nations Inter Press
Service Bureau. See, e.g., Madanmohan Rao, The Internet Will Become Increasingly Multi-
lingual, NETACROSS THE WORLD (Jan. 8, 1996)
<http://www.iworld.com/netday/NATWIN960205.html>, abstracted from HONG KONG
STANDARD, Jan. 4, 1996.
13. Cf. Alan J. Hartnick, Copyright & Trademark On the Internet-And Where to Sue,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 21, 1997, at 5 ("The cases are developing: Should a New Orleans web site
host be sued in Uganda?"); Wendy R. Leibowitz, The Internet Blunts TM Protection, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 10, 1997, at B1.
14. "Cyberspace refers to the interaction of people and businesses over computer net-
works, electronic bulletin boards, and commercial online services. The largest and most
visible manifestation of cyberspace is the Internet .... R. Timothy Muth, Old Doctrines
on A New Frontier: Defamation and Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, WIs. LAW. Sept. 1995, at
11, 11. See also the definition in EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND
THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 1-11 (1994).
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stitutions, the myth of an unregulated, independent space could grow.
Part of the happy mythology of the network holds that it is a self-
regulating entity, controlled by no government-one of the few instances
in history of successful anarchy.16 This was never completely true since
most countries have long-standing laws that regulate speech and com-
merce, irrespective of the medium.
7
It should not have been surprising that with its expansion the Net be-
came relevant to the "real" world. Legal reality intruded upon the world of
Internet: Where terms like "rape in cyberspace, cybertorts,""
"cybercrime,"'20 and "cyberterrorism ' '2' are created, the cry for regulation is
not far away.2 Regulation finally came to the surprise of "Netizens," not
15. "Since the Internet has moved from techie preserve to office park, shopping mall
and entertainment arcade, it is sheer fantasy to expect that it will be left a libertarian island
in a world full of jealous competitors and conflicting public objectives." Eli M. Noam, An
Unfettered Internet? Keep Dreaming, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1997, at Al.
16. A slightly different vision is offered by Joe Shea, Editor-in-Chief of The American
Reporter:
I think we need to defend the Net from all the people who want to regulate
it by creating the Internet Liberation Army (ILA), made up of a corps of top-flight
engineers working together to defeat various regulatory schemes by technical and
political means.
... Let's make the Net a virtual country and create a group of well-
disciplined people including leaders, an army and a population of supporters who
pledge to keep it free.
Message from Joe Shea to Cyber-Rights (Mar. 22, 1996) (available at Cyber-Rights Li-
brary)
<http://snyside.sunnyside.com/cpsr/lists/.../960322.crInternetLiberationArmy..-.>.
17. Cf Global Information Networks, Ministerial Conference Bonn 6-8 July 1997,
22 (visited Oct. 23, 1997) <http://www2.echo.lu/bonn/final.html> [hereinafter Ministerial
Conference] ("Ministers stress that the general legal frameworks should be applied on-line
as they are off-line.").
18. Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 21, 1993, at 36;
see also James Adams, US Paedophiles Lure Children on the Internet, SUNDAY TIMES-
LONDON, June 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7678431.
19. Rosalind Resnick, Cybertort: The New Era, NAT'LL.J., July 18, 1994, at Al.
20. Benjamin Wittes, Information-Highway Robbery: Is Law Enforcement Ready for
Cybercrime?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994, at 16; see also Marc S. Friedman & Kenneth R.
Buys, 'Infojacking': Crimes on the Information Superhighway, COMPUTER LAW., Oct. 1996,
at 1.
21. Euskadi Koordination, Political Censorship on the Internet, (Apr. 2, 1996)
(available at Cyber-Rights Library)
<http:llsnyside.sunnyside.com/cpsr/lists/. . /960403.cr_ PoliticalCensorship-on_Inte>
(protesting against an "Attentate against the Freedom of Speech and Privacy Rights through
a cyberterroristic attack against the publication of information about the Basque Country on
Internet"); see also John H. Cushman, Jr., Basque Web Site Suspended After Protests, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 1997, at D3.
22. See Scams and Frauds Spread Through Cyberspace, NETACROSS THE WORLD, ab-
stracted from Associated Press, Jan. 4, 1996 (on file with author); David Post, New Rules
for the Net?, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1995, at 112, 112 ('The backlash is coming from all
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just from the national level. 23 When CompuServe, Inc. blocked access by
its subscribers in the United States and around the world to two hundred
discussion groups after a federal prosecutor in Germany had indicated that
they might violate German pornography laws,24 users realized that
points on the political spectrum .... ); Peter H. Lewis, Group Urges Internet Ban on All
Hate Groups' Messages, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 1996, at Al; cf. Tony Tuths, State of the
Art... Traffic Court, THE NEW LEGIST, July/Aug./Sept. 1995, at 31, 31:
By this time next year, the great techno-unwashed will be hooked up. Over fifty
million Mom and Pops, Suzy and Biffs will be wired up to the Net, poking
around, and getting into trouble. And when that many people start reaching out
and touching each other, legal problems have been known to arise. In fact, we
could be witnessing the biggest legal goldrush since Palsgraf got plowed by that
scale.
23. The Communications Decency Act is just one example of the regulation of the Net
on the national level. See A Swedish Proposal for a Law About Computer-Mediated Com-
munication (visited Oct. 23, 1997)
<http://www.dsv.su.se/-jpalme/SOU-1996-40-eng.html>.
24. The incident is best described by the German journalist Michael Kunze who writes
for the major German news magazines, Der Spiegel and Der Spiegel Online. Message from
Michael Kunze to Cyber-Rights (Jan. 6, 1996) (available at Cyber-Rights Library)
<http://snyside.sunntside.com/cpsr/lists/.. 6011 1.crCIS-censorship%3aThewholeSt>.
A list of more than 200 news groups was presented to CompuServe as containing
"suspicious news groups." In the attached letter from the Munich prosecutor, it is recom-
mended to CompuServe "to take the necessary steps in order to avoid an eventual prosecu-
tion." Id.; see also Nathaniel Nash, Holding Compuserve Responsible, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15,
1996, at D4. Since CompuServe did not have the technical ability to block only German
users, it eliminated access for all its users, about 4 million worldwide. It seems as though
the prosecutor had tried to bring CompuServe to court to get his legal position checked.
CompuServe's servile tactics, however, frustrated this goal. The first comments in U.S.
newspapers were influenced by inaccurate facts. See, e.g., CompuServe Blocks 'NetSex
Groups, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 1995, at IA ("It is the most sweeping instance of Internet
censorship so far, and the most drastic action taken by a government."); cf Howard Gold-
berg, CompuServe Blocks Access to Sex Forums on Net, CHI. SUN-THIES, Dec. 30, 1995, at
12 (quoting Arno Edelmann, CompuServe product manager for Germany: "It is perhaps an
overreaction, but we want to cooperate with the Bavarian prosecutor's office."). Subse-
quently, however, when CompuServe decided to challenge prosecutors by restoring access
and handing out free software for blocking pornography, it was indicted for aiding in the
distribution of pornography and computer games. Prosecutors charged that CompuServe
did not do enough to block Germans from accessing the material. Edmund L. Andrews,
Germany's Efforts to Police Web Are Upsetting Business, N.Y. TIMas, June 6, 1997, at Al.
In another investigation in Hamburg, a prosecutor is considering whether America Online
should be liable for its members' dissemination of child pornography through e-mail ac-
counts. America Online contends that it cannot control what its members send out. Er-
mittlungen gegen AOL wegen der Verbreitung von Kinderpornographie, NEUE JuRisTIscHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT COMPUTERREPORT, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 392. In a third instance of Internet
investigation, German prosecutors forced German Internet access providers to block access
to a magazine published in the Netherlands which provided instructions on how to sabotage
railway lines. Blocking access, however, required that all content on the Dutch server-
including harmless content-be blocked. Dutch officials have complained, but not inter-
vened. Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet, supra note 6, pt. 4.b.iv. A left-wing
politician had to fend off German prosecutors for leading others to a link on her Web page
[Vol. 50
Number 1] INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE 123
"cyberspace doesn't belong to a single country,"5 but to a whole range of
countries with diverse legal concepts.
Many other States have expressed an interest in regulating the Inter-
net. Chinese officials announced in January 1996 that they wanted to stop
"detrimental information" from entering the country via the Internet.2 The
French Government is said to have complained to CompuServe that there
is too much English on the Internet.27 Britain's "Home Office is currently
examining how the Internet can be regulated."' "The Malaysian govern-
ment has proposed a bold new legal framework, popularly known as the
'cyberlaws,"' '29 which extends beyond the shores of Malaysia. The director
of policy and planning at the Singapore Broadcasting Authority, the gov-
ernment's regulatory body for the Internet and broadcast media, said: "In
cases where a libelous act has been committed, whether or not it is done on
the internet or any other public medium, the laws of Singapore still ap-
to the "terrorist" magazine. The charges were eventually dismissed, but attorneys for both
sides agreed that the court's narrow decision did not resolve the issue of restricting Internet
access. Edmund L. Andrews, German Judge Dismisses Criminal Charge Over Internet
Link, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at D7. According to prosecutorial spokesman Ruediger
Reiff prior to the court's decision, "Those who committed the initial crime of writing the
articles... are as yet unidentified, but Ms. Marquardt appears to have committed the crime
of aiding this felony. Press freedom does not go that far." German Left-Winger's Links
Break Lmv?, NErDAY NEws (Jan. 17, 1997)
<http://netday.iworld.com/97Jan/1703-german.html>. In court Marquardt said that the
German prosecutors' efforts to stop her reminded her "[o]f the kind of censorship we pro-
tested against in East Germany." Edmund L. Andrews, German Judge Dismisses Criminal
Charge Over Internet Link, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at D7.
25. John Markoff, On-Line Service Blocks Access to Topics Called Pornographic, N.Y.
TMEs, Dec. 29, 1995, at Al (quoting Esther Dyson, Chairperson, Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation); see also Edmund L. Andrews, Germany's Efforts to Police Web are Upsetting
Business, N.Y. THAES, June 6, 1997, at Al (Chris Kuner, an American cyberspace lawyer in
Germany stated: "[t]he Internet created a universal jurisdiction, so that once you are on the
Internet you are subject to the laws of every country in the world."); see also Message from
Robert Cannon, Esq., to Cyber-Rights (Mar. 15, 1996) (available at Cyber-Rights Library)
<http:lwww.cpsr.orglcpsr/niilcyber-rights/Library/> ("We must remember that simply be-
cause what we do is legal in our country, it does not mean that it is legal in another coun-
try.").
26. Peter H. Lewis, Limiting A Medium Without Boundaries, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 15,
1996, at Dl; see also Seth Faison, Chinese Tiptoe Into Internet, Wary of Watchdogs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at A3; Mesher, supra note 9, at 57.
27. Message from Patrick Brennan to Cyber-Rights (Jan. 7, 1996) (available at Cyber-
Rights Library) <http://www.cpsr.orglcpsr/lists/lis... cr_ 1289_% 3a.Compuserve_cavesI>;
see also Noam, supra note 15. But see The Internet Will Become Increasingly Multilingual,
NETACROSS THE WORLD (Jan. 8, 1996), abstracted from HONG KONG STANDARD, Jan. 4,
1996. (on file with author).
28. George Cole, Censorship in Cyberspace, THE FIN. TIMES, March 21, 1996, at 20,
available in 1996 WL 6151123; Gregston, supra note 8, at 53.
29. Dato V. L. Kandan & Chuah Jem Ern, Malaysia Prepares "Cyberlaws", INTELL.
PROP. WORLDWIDE (July/Aug. 1997) <http://www.ipww.comljul97/pllmalaysia.html>.
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ply." 30
Meanwhile, it is hard to maintain that the Net is some kind of free
city in the sky.31 Politics and pornography are not the only reasons why
governments want to control the Internet. There are financial aspects, suchS 32 •• 3 4• 3
as taxation, intellectual property rights,3 trade,3 and gambling.35 As gov-
ernments need to control their revenues, the desire to control the Net
36grows. One question of importance is certainly still the question of how
to regulate cyberspace. 37 More and more important, however, becomes the
question of who has authority to regulate cyberspace. As individual
30. Singapore Laws Will Apply in Cyberspace, NETACROSS THE WORLD (FEB. 26,
1996), abstracted from THE STRAITS (Singapore), Feb. 24, 1996 (on file with author). The
government is requiring the registration of operators and owners of Web sites containing
political or religious information. Mesher, supra note 9, at 57; see also Noam, supra note
15.
31. Cf. Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet, supra note 6, at 2 ("What is illegal
offline remains illegal online .... ); id. at 3 ("[T]he Internet does not exist in a legal vac-
uum .... ).
32. See, e.g., Carol M. Beach, Taxing the Internet (posted Mar. 29, 1997)
<http:llwww.slate.comlGist/97-03-29/gist.asp>; John Berry, Who will Tax the Web?,
INTERNET WORLD, April 1997, at 37.
33. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1995) (discussing the problems of intellectual property and
copyright as they apply to the Internet). The report eloquently poses the choice of law
problem: "Which country's law controls the resolution of a copyright infringement dis-
pute-the country from which a copyrighted work is uploaded or to which it is down-
loaded, or the country where the host server is located?" Id. at 147; see also Martin H. Sam-
son, Trademark Lawsuits in Cyberspace, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1996, at S10; Alan J. Hartnick,
Copyright & Trademark on the Internet (visited Oct. 23, 1997)
<http://www.ljx.com/intemet/02cptmint.html>.
34. Cf. William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce (visited Oct. 23, 1997) <http://www.ljx.com/internet/ecommframe.html>
(explaining the new approach of the U.S. government).
35. See Internet Casino Opens in South Africa, NETACROSS THE WORLD (APR. 1, 1996),
abstracted from WKLY. MAIL & GUARDIAN (South Africa), March 29, 1996; see also The
Gaming Club (visited Oct. 23, 1997) <http://www.casino.co.za>.
36. See Cole, supra note 28; Internet Could Become Dirty Money Haven, Reuters News
Service, March 13, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
37. Some Internet enthusiasts, focusing on the electronic bits, hope that the Internet is
beyond regulation. However, a government can go after physical elements, if not intangible
ones. "Communications are a matter not just of signals but of people, institutions and
physical hardware .... Noam, supra note 15; cf., e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cy-
berlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995).
38. Geanne Rosenberg framed the question as follows: "Whether a person or business
on the Internet falls under the laws of some, all or any of the jurisdictions from which that
Internet site can be reached." Geanne Rosenberg, Trying to Resolve Jurisdictional Rules on
the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at DI; see also David R. Johnson, Traveling in
Cyberspace, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at 26; John Perry Barlow, Thinking Locally, Act-
ing Globally, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 76; David G. Post, Anarchy, State and the Internet: An
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countries begin to regulate cyberspace, their decisions reach far beyond
national borders. Can one country be so influential in regulating the Net
that the consequences are felt around the world? How far may a country
go? Or, as The Economist preferred to formulate the question in the after-
math of the CompuServe case: "When Bavaria wrinkles its nose, must the
whole world catch a cold?"
39
This analysis covers bases of international jurisdiction in cyberspace.
It identifies criteria which enable a State to prescribe rules for cyberspace,
to subject violators of these rules to the process of its courts, and eventu-
ally to enforce these rules. Domestic multijurisdictional cases are ana-
lyzed, not for their correctness under U.S. law, but for their precedential
value for international multijurisdictional cases.
The focus of this analysis is to show that States are not impressed by
an alleged "independence from geographical constraints" resulting from
the "electronic nature of the message transmission ' '40 or by a presumed
failure of "territorially-based laws" to reach persons "whose geographical
jurisdictions span legal jurisdictions.",4 ' As the focus is on the competence
of the State to exercise jurisdiction, collateral consequences for the indi-
vidual, such as the possibility to pursue a lawsuit in a variety of different
jurisdictions, will be of only subordinate interest for this analysis.42
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION
Under international law, a State is subject to limitations on its
authority to exercise jurisdiction in cases that involve foreign interests or
Essay in Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, para. 4
<http:ll www.law.comell.edu/jol/post.html>; T.J. Thurston, Tackling Conflicts of Law on
the Internet, THE INTERNET NEWSLETTER, March 1997, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Cumws file; John P. Ratnaswamy & Ross E. Kimbarovsky, Where Can a Person or
Business Be Sued for Alleged Claims Arising From Their Use of the Internet? 25
COMPUTER L. REP. (May 1997) <http:/www.hopsut.com/intemet.html>.
39. Sex on the Internet, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 18.
40. Post, supra note 38, para. 38; see also David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1378 (1996). For a pro-
found criticism of this idealistic approach, see Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REv. 1403 (1996).
41. Johnson, supra note 38, at 26.
42. See, e.g., Matthew R. Burmstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transna-
tional Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1996); Eric J. McCarthy, Comment,
Networking in Cyberspace: Electronic Defamation and the Potential for International Fo-
rum Shopping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 527 (1995); Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Me-
dia in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S. Libel Law, 16 HASTINGS COMM/ENT
L.J. 235 (1994); Michael Smyth & Nick Braithwaite, First U.K. Bulletin Board Defamation
Suit Brought, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at C10; Richard H. Acker, Comment, Choice-of-
Law Questions in Cyberfraud, 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 437.
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activities.43 International law, however, does not impose hard and fast rules
on States delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction. Rather, it leaves
States wide discretion in the matter. Nevertheless, the existence of limits is
undisputed. Every State has an obligation to exercise moderation and re-
straint in invoking jurisdiction over cases that have a foreign element, and
they should avoid undue encroachment on the jurisdiction of other States.4
4
A State that exercises jurisdiction in an overly self-centered way not only
contravenes international law, but it can also "disturb the international or-
der and produce political, legal, and economic reprisals.
' 45
Traditionally, three kinds of jurisdiction are distinguished: jurisdic-
tion to prescribe, or legislative jurisdiction; jurisdiction to adjudicate, or
judicial jurisdiction; and jurisdiction to enforce, or executive jurisdiction.46
Jurisdiction to prescribe is the first step in many analyses. Jurisdiction to
adjudicate does not apply in the absence of jurisdiction to prescribe unless
the forum State is willing to apply the law of a foreign State. For jurisdic-
tion to enforce, States also regularly need jurisdiction to prescribe. These
distinctions can be important in determining the limits of a country's juris-
diction under international law. Depending on the nature of the jurisdiction
being exercised, the requisite contacts with a State necessary to support the
exercise of jurisdiction differ.47 The three types of jurisdiction however,
are often interdependent, and their scope and limitations are shaped by
similar considerations.44 The following analysis of the international law of
jurisdiction is based on the assumption that the relevant provisions of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States cor-
rectly restate the consensus of the community of nations.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 401 cmt. a
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
44. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 17-53
(Feb. 5).
45. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1127 (1966); Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judi-
cial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 33 (1987).
46. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1046 (3d ed. 1993); BARRY E. CARTER
& PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 726 (2d ed. 1995); Bernard H. Oxman, Juris-
diction of States, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAWv 277 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., Instalment 10 1987); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 159 (2d ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 401.
47. Oxman, supra note 46, at 277.
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, at 230-31.
49. Cf. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE QUEST FOR
REASONABLENESS 19 (1996). Gary B. Born took a cautious approach when the Restatement
was adopted. Born, supra note 45, at 19 (the "'reasonableness test'probably reflects an
emerging consensus on international law in this field").
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A. Jurisdiction to Prescribe
1. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Jurisdiction to prescribe means a State's authority to make its sub-
. 50
stantive laws applicable to particular persons and circumstances. Interna-
tional law has long recognized limitations on the authority of States to ex-
ercise jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances affecting the interests of
other States. In principle, it was accepted that a State had legislative juris-
diction to regulate activities within its territory, as well as the conduct of
its nationals abroad.5' Yet, there is wide international consensus that not
even the links of territoriality or nationality suffice in all instances for the
exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe.52 For instance, according to Article 34
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomats are ex-
empted from most dues and taxes.
Restatement section 402 summarizes bases of jurisdiction which in-
dicate a legitimate interest of a State to assert jurisdiction to prescribe as
follows:
Subject to section 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within
its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside
as well as within its territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals
that is directed against the security of the state or against a lim-
ited class of other state interests.54
These principles are known as the territoriality principle, the nationality
principle, the effects principle, and the protective principle.
55
50. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, at 236-37.
51. L § 403 cmt. a.
52. Id.
53. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 34, 500 U.N.T.S.
95.
54. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 402.
55. Another principle, the passive personality principle, will not be discussed in this
analysis. The passive personality principle asserts that a State may apply law-particularly
criminal law-to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its national where
the victim of the act was its national. The principle has not been generally applied with ap-
proval for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist at-
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The broad bases of jurisdiction restated by section 402 are limited by
section 403 which imposes a general requirement of reasonableness:
(1) Even when one of the bases of jurisdiction under [section] 402 is
present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law
with respect to a person or activity having connection with an-
other state when the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable. 56
Section 2 of section 403 enumerates different factors which have to be
evaluated in determining the reasonableness of assertion of jurisdiction.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is un-
reasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, in-
cluding, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state,
i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the terri-
tory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in
the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state
and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability
of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradi-
tions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
51(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
When the prescriptions of two States are in conflict, each State has an ob-
ligation to evaluate its own as well as the other State's interest in exercis-
ing jurisdiction. A State should defer to the other State if that State's inter-
est is clearly greater.58
Another basis of internationally-recognized jurisdiction-universality
tacks and other organized attacks on a State's nationals by reason of their nationality. So
far, no realistic scenarios have arisen in the cyberspace context that would provoke use of
the passive personality principle.
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 403(1).
57. Id. § 403(2).
58. Id. § 403(3); see also INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE ExTRA-
TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS, 38-40 & 46-48 (Dieter Lange & Gary Born
eds., 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE].
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jurisdiction-is described in section 404 of the Restatement:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal con-
cern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft,
genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even
where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in [section] 402 is
present.
59
2. Application in Cyberspace
a. Territoriality Principle
"The territoriality principle is by far the most common basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, and it has been generally free from
controversy. ' ' 0 This principle would allow a State to order service provid-
ers who operate on its territory to obey its regulations. It would further al-
low barring access to certain Web sites from machines operating within
the State's territory. States insist, in fact, on their sovereignty to control
activities which happen in their territory even if these activities are not
61 62limited to the national territory, and even if control might be ineffective.
Under international law, States can even incur international responsibility
if they allow their territory to be used for unlawful activities directed
against other States.63
In the CompuServe case, German law was held applicable to bar ac-
cess for German users to certain news groups. The consequence was that
"German law is dictating what American citizens can read and view."
64
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 404.
60. Id. § 402 cmt. c.
61. See, e.g., Nathaniel C. Nash, Germans Again Bar Internet Access, This Time to
Neo-Nazism, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at D6. The Germany-based T-Online service of
Deutsche Telekom, a privatized former State enterprise, said it voluntarily blocked access to
the World Wide Web site of Ernst Ziindel, a Toronto-based Neo-Nazi, after German prose-
cutors warned the company that they were investigating whether it was helping to incite
racial hatred. According to the European Commission, "some third countries have intro-
duced wide-ranging legislation to block all direct access to Internet via access providers by
introducing a requirement for 'proxy servers' similar to those used by large organisations
for security reasons, combined with centralised blacklisting of documents .... " Illegal and
Harmful Content on the Internet, supra note 6, pt. 4.b.iv.
62 See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, UMass Shuts Down Web Site Containing Neo-Nazi Mate-
rial, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2, 1996, at 28. Free speech advocates at Stanford University and
Carnegie-Mellon University have obtained the offending material (Holocaust-revisionist
Web pages), posted it on other Web sites, and urged others to post it in locations not
blocked by Deutsche Telekom. The idea is to put the material on so many Web sites that
Germany would have to completely disconnect from the Internet to censor it. Id.
63. Cf. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,22 (Apr. 9).
64. John Markoff, German Pornography Laws Determine What America Sees, N.Y.
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This effect, however, was incidental. It was caused by the inability of
CompuServe to tailor its services to the laws of each country in which it
operates. There is no need to invoke the reasonableness limitation in this
case. No State can seriously be expected to make the application of its pe-
nal laws depend on the software of a service provider operating in its ter-
ritory. Not even CompuServe expected to conduct business in Germany
free from the application of German laws.66 Meanwhile, it seems as though
special filtering software could systematically map out specific addresses
that contain certain kinds of content.67
Under the territoriality principle, it was also permissible for France to
force the French campus of Atlanta's Georgia Institute of Technology to
translate its Web site into French.6' The Institute found itself in a Paris
courtroom in early 1997. Its Web site displaying course offerings on its
French campus was hosted on a French server. Thus, under a 1994 French
law, the Web site was required to be in the French language. 69 Similar lan-
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, § 4, at 2.
65. Cf LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL AcTs 107 (1989). ("It cannot be
the case that a state is prohibited from engaging in any actions that produce changes in an-
other state, because in an interdependent world, virtually everything that one state does has
impacts on the others.").
66. See Howard Goldberg, CompuServe Blocks Access to Sex Forums on Net, CHI.
SuN-TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at 12 (quoting the statement of CompuServe spokesman Wil-
liam Giles: "We're in over 140 countries around the world. If you want to play in their
yard, you have to play by their rules."); see also Terence Gallagher, German Cabinet Ap-
proves Internet Regulation, (Dec. 19, 1996) (available at Cyber-Rights Library)
<http://snyside.sunnyside.com/cpsr/.. .9.cr_German_Regulation of Interne>:
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's cabinet approved an Internet regulatory bill
Wednesday that seeks to protect users' privacy and keep out smut and Nazi
propaganda .... The... law puts responsibility... on 'suppliers' [who are
warned that illegal] material can be accessed through their systems [if] they have
the technical means to block it.
In response to this new proposed "multimedia law," CompuServe is considering "moving
its German operations to a neighboring country if the law becomes too restrictive." Id.; see
also John Browning, Europeans On-Line: National Boundaries Still Matter, Even in Cyber-
space, Scr. Am., May 1995, at 35 (stating that as U.S.-dominated on-line services emerge in
Europe, one of the "optimistic assumptions" of cyberspace is about to be challenged: that
there are no geographical limits or boundaries in cyberspace).
67. John Markoff, On-Line Service Blocks Access to Topics Called Pornographic, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 29, 1995, at Al; Peter H. Lewis, Limiting a Medium Without Boundaries, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 15, 1996, at D1.
68. Cf. Eric Schneiderman & Ronald Kornreich, Personal Jurisdiction and Internet
Commerce, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 1997, at 1 (arguing "that lawyers and courts should focus
their analysis of in personam jurisdiction based on Web contacts by evaluating the quantity
and quality of contacts with a Web site by a forum's citizens.").
69. Wendy R. Leibowitz, How Risky Is Business on the Internet?, NAT'L L.J., May 26,
1997, at B1. The Paris court decided on June 9, 1997 to dismiss the lawsuit, but only on
procedural grounds. Legal Headlines (visited June 10, 1997)
<http://www.ljx.com/news/french.htm>; Wendy R. Leibowitz, National Laws Entangle the
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guage laws apply in Quebec.70
The territoriality principle, however, would not allow extraterritorial
application of national law. An Islamic country, for instance, could legally
force a local service provider to comply with a regulation banning access
of local users to Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses. But this principle
would not cover an order to remove the controversial novel from the Net in
general. Therefore, the attempt of a U.S. agency official in August 1996 to
apply the Helms-Burton Act to Internet links from Austria to Iran71 was
unlawful under international law.
A U.S. case, American Library Ass'n v. Pataki,72 also demonstrates
the limits of the territoriality principle, not on the State versus world level,
but on the state versus U.S. level. The court overturned a New York state
law protecting children from receiving obscene and indecent material. The
practical effect of that statute was that Internet users, in-state or not, were
responsible for any posting of such material that New York children could
access. According to the court, "Internet users have no way to determine
the characteristics of their audience that are salient under the New York
Act-age and geographic location."73 The court determined that the Inter-
net, "analogous to a highway or railroad," was an instrument of interstate
commerce and was therefore governed by the Commerce Clause.74
b. Nationality Principle
The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens or nationals
anywhere in the world is, like territorial jurisdiction, basically noncontro-
versial.75 For example, more and more States are outlawing child sex tour-
ism. This makes sexual intercourse with a child punishable for the adult
even if the act is tolerated or legal in the country where the act is commit-
'Net: It's A Small, Small, Litigious Web, NAT'L L.J., June 30, 1997, at B7.
70. Mike King, Language Police Patrolling Internet Sites, THE GAZErIT (Montreal),
June 14, 1997, at Al; Leibowitz, supra note 69.
71. Declan McCullagh, Banning Iran, HOTWIRED (Aug. 28, 1996)
<http://www.eff.org/-declan/global/iran/hw.iran.082896.txt>.
72. American Library, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
73. Id. at 167.
74. Id. at 161; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
75. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 46, ch. 7; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421
(1932); J. L. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs 231-32 (Oxford 5th ed. 1955). But see Geof-
frey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction,
17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 83 (1992) ('The United States, the crusading champion of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, continues to reject one of the least controversial forms of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction, nationality-based jurisdiction. As a result, U.S. nationals commit seri-
ous crimes overseas and escape prosecution.").
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ted. Insofar as Germany makes even its nationals residing abroad subject
to its prohibition against the dissemination of child pornography,77 it is
acting in accordance with international law.
The nationality principle is applicable to juristic as well as to natural
persons.7 ' As the German branch of CompuServe Inc., for example, is
chartered as a German company, it is subject to German law.79
In addition to the territoriality principle, therefore, service providers
will in many cases also be subject to jurisdiction under the nationality
principle.
c. Effects Principle
The effects principle can be invoked when an act committed in one
State causes injury in the territory of another State. Jurisdiction is
grounded in the fact that the injurious effect, although not the act or omis-
sion itself, occurred in the territory of the State. Controversies may par-
ticularly arise where the conduct was lawful where carried out. This prin-
ciple has been a major source of controversy in antitrust cases where it was
invoked to support regulation of activities abroad by foreign nationals be-
cause of the economic impact of those activities in the regulating State.81As a basis for jurisdiction however, it is increasingly accepted 2 even when
76. See Margaret A. Healy, Prosecuting Child Sex Tourists at Home: Do Laws in Swe-
den, Australia, and the United States Safeguard the Rights of Children as Mandated by In-
ternational Law?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1852 (1995).
77. §§ 6, 184(3) StGB (German Penal Code). For a translation, see, for example, The
Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany, 28 THE AMERIcAN SERIES OF FOREIGN
PENAL CODES (Edward M. Wise ed. & Joseph J. Darby trans., 1987). According to the
wording of StGB § 6, German law is even applicable to certain international crimes of non-
nationals committed abroad. However, the German Federal Supreme Court for Criminal
Matter considered the principle of nonintervention and required a legitimizing link of the
case with Germany. BGH Urteil, StR, 3 (1976), 298; see also SCHONKE & SCHRODER,
STRAFGESETZBUCH - KOMMENTAR, introductory note to §§ 3-7 n.8 (Albin Eser) (25th ed.
1997); Wilhelm Wengler, VdIkerrechtliche Schranken des Anwendungsbereichs von Straf-
gesetzen, 32 Juristenzeitung 257 (1977); Philip Kunig, Die Bedeutung des Nichtein-
mischungsprinzips fiir das Internationale Strafrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 18
Juristische Schulung 595 (1978).
78. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 402 cmt. e.
79. See David Plotnikoff, Bite Lacking in Protests of On-Line Censorship, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEws, Jan. 4, 1996. ("Last week, a foreign power successfully bullied an Ameri-
can company into pulling the plug on part of the news feed that reaches millions of Ameri-
cans.").
80. Oxman, supra note 46, at 280; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
81. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 58, at 4-32; RICHARD WHiSH,
COMPErTON LAW 370-385 (3d ed. 1993).
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 402 reporters' n.; Jason Coppel, A Hard Look at
the Effects Doctrine of Jurisdiction in Public International Law, 6 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 73
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its excessive application, especially by the United States, is criticized.
(1) General Approaches
(a) United States v. Thomas
Probably the first cyberspace case where the effects principle was in-
voked was United States v. Thomas.84 Even though this case is a domestic
one, it is important because it addresses some of the issues arising in inter-
national cross-border cases. The defendants operated a computer bulletin
board system from their home in California. They loaded on their bulletin
board images depicting bestiality, oral sex, incest, sadomasochistic abuse,
and sex scenes involving urination. Access to the files was limited to
members who were given a password after they paid a membership fee and
submitted a signed application form that requested the applicant's age, ad-
dress, and telephone number. An undercover agent was accepted as a
member. When the agent downloaded explicit material in Memphis, Ten-
nessee, the defendants were indicted in federal court in Tennessee on sev-
eral criminal violations.
The defendants challenged the venue in Tennessee, claiming that the
criminal act-the transportation of the material--did not occur in Tennes-
see, but in California. The Sixth Circuit concluded that "the effects of the
Defendants' criminal conduct reached the Western District of Tennessee,
and that district was suitable for accurate fact-finding. 85 Accordingly, the
court found that venue was proper irithat judicial district.
During the same month that the Thomases were sentenced in Tennes-
see, Mr. Thomas was indicted for similar criminal charges in Utah federal
court. He argued unsuccessfully that the charges should be dismissed
based on collateral estoppel and double jeopardy, stemming from the Ten-
86
nessee conviction.
With the same theory used by Tennessee and Utah prosecutors,
(1993); Margaret Loo, IBM v. Commissioner: The Effects Test in the EEC, 10 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 125 (1987).
83. Werner Meng, Regeln fiber die Jurisdiktion der Staaten im amerikanischen
[Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law], 27 ARCHrV DES VOLKERRECHTs 156, 183
(1989) (preferring to justify the results of the effects principle by reference to general prin-
ciples of international law); see also F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction
Revisited After Twenty Years, 186 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 26 (1984 111) ("[r]he purely commercial
effect... should be insufficient to confer... any international right to prescribe conduct
abroad."); cf Vaughan Lowe, International Law and the Effects Doctrine in the European
Court of Justice, 48 CAMBRmGE L.J. 9 (1989).
84. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
85. Id. at 710.
86. United States v. Thomas, 113 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1997).
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which focussed on where materials were accessed, the defendants could
have been indicted in Saudi Arabia, where standards concerning indecency
are probably even stricter than in the U.S. At least insofar as international
jurisdiction is concerned,87 it is not clear whether the downloading of files
in a certain country makes the sender's activities subject to foreign juris-
diction. However, in Tennessee's United States v. Thomas, the defendants
knew the jurisdiction in which their files were being accessed, and the
downloading could not occur without their approval. The case is no prece-
dent for jurisdiction over a sender's activities based on the random down-
loading of files that happen to be illegal in certain jurisdictions.
(b) Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc. 8' is the
first published international case addressing multijurisdictional issues in
cyberspace. Here, a careful analysis of the scope of the court's jurisdiction
was presented. In this trademark case, a publisher offered and distributed
sexually explicit photos to netizens, including U.S. customers, from a Web
site in Italy. Customers had to subscribe to his service and pay a monthly
fee; therefore, the publisher was aware that his material was entering spe-
cific jurisdictions, such as the U.S. 9 The court held that distribution of the
materials in the United States was a violation of a fifteen-year-old U.S.
court order prohibiting the use of the trademark, "Playmen," in magazines
distributed in the United States. It stated:
The Internet is a world-wide phenomenon, accessible from every cor-
ner of the globe. [Defendant] cannot be prohibited from operating its
Internet site merely because the site is accessible from within one
country in which its product is banned. To hold otherwise "would be
tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court
throughout the world, may assert jurisdiction over all information pro-
87. On the national level the federal prosecution of the Thomases looks more like "a
good example of bad law." Mark Eckenwiler, Criminal Law and the Internet, LEGAL TIMEs,
Jan. 23, 1995, at S32. Because the federal obscenity laws regulate all kinds of transfer, no
special issues are raised in the cyberspace context. The question whether the "contemporary
community standards" requirement should be modified is therefore not really caused by
technological innovations. The problem arises even when a person is travelling from the
East Coast to the West Coast with pornographic material in the trunk. For a summary of the
problems, see CAvAzos & MORiN, supra note 14, at 89-104; John S. Zanghi, "Community
Standards" in Cyberspace, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 96 (1995); William S. Byassee, Juris-
diction in Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 197 (1995); Timothy S.T. Bass, Comment, Obscenity in Cyberspace: Some
Reasons for Retaining the Local Community Standard, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471.
88. Playboy Enter., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
89. Id. at 1039.
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viders on the global World Wide Web. '"
Even though the court concluded that it could not prescribe conduct on the
global Internet, it was entitled to prohibit access to the computer sites in
the United States.9' Thus, the defendant was enjoined from offering his
magazine to customers residing in the United States.
Insofar as a State limits the domestic effects of a Web site perceived
as dangerous to its citizens, it is in accordance with international law.
However, that State is not permitted to outlaw the activity completely un-
less it has jurisdiction based on territoriality, nationality or universality.
The Playboy Enterprises Court's differentiated analysis, which con-
siders both national interests and the interests of other nations, is a good
model for Internet cases in the international context.
(c) Florida Attorney General
In the matter of jurisdiction over Internet communications, the Flor-
ida Attorney General has chosen to throw up his hands and look to the fed-
eral government for the regulation of Internet gambling activities.2 Florida
residents are placing bets at "virtual casinos" through the Internet, but their
activities cannot be tracked because of the companies' complex encryption
techniques and location in foreign jurisdictions.93 According to the Florida
Attorney General, the task of cracking the encryption codes and regulating
the Internet is suited, not for the "patchwork attention" of individual states,
but for the federal government. 4
(d) Minnesota Attorney General
On the other end of the spectrum, the broadest approach has been
taken by Minnesota Attorney General Humphrey, who circulated a memo-
randum, entitled "WARNING TO ALL INTERNET USERS AND
PROVIDERS," asserting broad jurisdiction over any Internet activity
•95
having an effect on Minnesota. The memorandum argued in favor of per-
sonal jurisdiction over anyone "[w]ho transmit[s] information via the In-
90. Id. (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 1040.
92. Gambling-Wire Communications-Lotteries-Use of Internet or Wire Communi-
cations to Conduct Gambling; Cruises to Nowhere, Op. Fla. Att'y Gen., No. AGO 95-70,
1995 WL 698073 (Oct. 18, 1995).
93. Id. at *4, *6.
94. Id. at*7.
95. Warning to All Internet Users and Providers, Mem. Minn. Att'y Gen. (visited Oct.
24, 1997) <http:/www. state.mn.us/ebranch/ag/memo.txt> [hereinafter Minnesota Memo-
randum]; see also Mark Eckenwiler, States Get Entangled in the Web, LEGAL TimEs, Jan.
22, 1996, at S35.
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ternet knowing that information will be disseminated in Minnesota ....
The Attorney General pointed to the state's general criminal jurisdic-
tion statute, which makes it a crime when a person who, while outside the
state, causes a crime to "result" in the state or causes another to commit a
crime within the state.97 He drew an analogy to a classic scenario of inter-... 98
national criminal jurisdiction. Just as Minnesota has jurisdiction over
someone outside the state who fires a rifle at someone in the state, the ar-
gument goes, so Minnesota has the power to enforce its laws against pur-
veyors of on-line fraud.99 He described the illegality of gambling activities
initiated outside the state but made available to Minnesota residents. He
also described the correctness of regulation over Native Americans on a
reservation who purchased space for political advertisements in a newspa-
per circulated within Minnesota. The Attorney General stated, "the[se] ...
principles of Minnesota law apply equally to activities on the Internet. In-
dividuals and organizations outside of Minnesota who disseminate infor-
mation in Minnesota via the Internet and thereby cause a result to occur in
Minnesota are subject to state criminal and civil laws."'
This approach is broader than that taken in Playboy Enterprises,'0 '
because the sender's knowledge and approval of distribution in a particular
jurisdiction is assumed. However, to understand the legal difficulties cre-
ated by this broad allegation of jurisdiction, it is important to have a closer
look at the variety of ways in which the Internet can be used to disseminate
information.
96. Minnesota Memorandum, supra note 95.
97. Id.
98. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE CODIFICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1926).
99. The power to enforce presupposes jurisdiction to enforce. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 43, § 432 introductory note.
100. Minnesota Memorandum, supra note 95. The Attorney General applied his argu-
ment in opposing a motion to dismiss by a gambling company:
[E]very day for at least nine months defendants have solicited business from hun-
dreds of thousands of Minnesota consumers by advertising two sports gambling
services on the computer network known as the Internet. Although this... in-
volves a relatively new technology, .. . the legal principle is not new: the State
has jurisdiction to protect the public from unlawful solicitations by enjoining
companies which have solicited business from Minnesota citizens.
State's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 1996
WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (No. C6-95-007227)
<http:llwww.state.mn.us/ebranch/aglbrief.txt>.
101. Playboy Enter. Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
[Vol. 50
Number 1] INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE 137
(2) Specific Approaches
(a) E-mail
E-mail is similar to its conventional paper counterpart in that it al-
lows individuals to correspond with one another. Like every other me-
dium, it can be used for criminal activities.' 2 Armed with the intended re-
cipient's unique user name and address, the sender of e-mail can compose
a message that will be deposited into the recipient's mailbox. The message
becomes available to the recipient when she next comes on-line. In prin-
ciple, e-mail messages are no different from letters and phone calls, as
long as the international character of the communication is known to the
sender.1O Whereas it is more or less obvious that an address like
"uchicago.edu" belongs to a user who resides in the United States, the ad-
dress is not always so clear as to the user's residence. An address at a ma-
jor commercial Internet service could be associated with a user in the
United States or abroad.1°5 That fact, in turn, raises serious questions about
the reasonableness of jurisdiction if the sender is not aware of the recipi-
ent's country.
The effects principle is not controversial with respect to acts such as
shooting a gun or sending libelous publications across the border.' 6 In
these cases, the transnational character of the act is normally obvious for
the actor. But where the sender of an e-mail message is not aware that the
message is received in another country, the situation is different. In this
case, there is no link of the activity to the territory of the regulating State
and no connection between the regulating State and the sender of the mes-
sage. The activity is not characterized here by any international contact.
The assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe is therefore limited to situations
in which it is known or at least foreseeable that substantial effects will oc-
cur in another State.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991); David K. McGraw,
Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwelcome E-Mail, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 491 (1995); Former Italian Judge Receives Death Threats-Via
Internet, NETAcROSS THE WoRLD (Mar. 25, 1996), abstractedfromAGENCE FRANCE PRESS;
STRAITs TIMES (Singapore) March 24, 1996 (on file with author); Editorial, Policing Cyber-
space, N.J. L.J., Feb. 27, 1995, at 22; E-Mail Is Becoming A Conduit of Prejudice on Many
Campuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1997, at 40.
103. CAvAzos & MORiN, supra note 14, at 5.
104. Cf Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime For "Cyberspace", 55 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 993, 1053 (1994).
105. Eckenwiler, supra note 87.
106. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 402 cmt. d; see also Lamar v. United States, 240
U.S. 60 (1916) (holding that a telephone fraud could be prosecuted where the call termi-
nated instead of where it originated from).
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(b) Bulletin Boards
Messages posted to public bulletin boards pose similar questions of
jurisdiction. A writer posting messages containing anti-Semitism, racism,
or hatred in any form knows or ought to know one thing: copies of the
message will ultimately be distributed to Internet sites all over the world.
Does this subject a non-German to the German prohibition on importation•10710
and distribution of Nazi propaganda on the denial of the Holocaust?' °8
According to the Attorney General of Minnesota there should be no
doubt that it does. But his analysis is too short sighted. It imposes an un-
reasonable burden on the sender of a posting to be aware of criminal li-
ability for his posting in hundreds of different jurisdictions when he cannot
control the distribution. Furthermore, it would be technically difficult to
exclude certain jurisdictions from the distribution of such postings in such
a situation.
According to press reports, many German neo-Nazis have found
shelter in the "electronic fortresses" of Bulletin Boards.'09 Hundreds of ex-
treme rightists are reported to be going on-line, using the Internet to access
material illegal in Germany-such as anti-Semitic and Holocaust revi-
sionist treatises-and communicate their views of intolerance. Participants
appear to know that their activities are prohibited by German penal law.
Assuming they know that they are communicating within an identifiable
circle of people centered within a particular jurisdiction, the communica-
107. § 86, 86a StGB (German Penal Code).
108. Id. §§ 130(3), 220a(l). For the application of this provision, the conviction of
Guenter Deckert in Germany's Federal Supreme Court of Justice is instructive:
In this decision, the Federal Supreme Court of Justice clearly enunciated its
position that denial of the fact of the Holocaust is a serious crime and should be
handled as such in view of its serious implications. The defendant Deckert is a
right wing extremist who was charged with incitement to riot and promoting ra-
cial hatred. The Landgericht in Mannheim had sentenced [him] to one year of
probation for expressing his belief that the Nazis did not commit mass murder of
the Jews in the gas chambers, but this was a mitigated sentence as the court saw
his as an honest expression of a political opinion in the effort to protect Germany
from what he saw as unjust recriminations.
The Federal Supreme Court of Justice .... [held that] [t]here is no consti-
tutional right or principle which allows for the justification or even mitigation of a
criminal act through the devaluating characterization of a particular group. Fi-
nally, the Landgericht was in error by even considering a sentence mitigation in a
case dealing with criminal penalties geared at maintaining the public order.
The Deckert Case: No Tolerance for Holocaust Denial (last modified Jan. 26, 1995)
<http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/Entscheidungen/abstracts/deckert.html> France has a similar
law prohibiting denial of the existence of crimes against humanity. Alan Riding, French
Icon Stumbles In Debate on Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1996, at A10.
109. Frank Bajak, As Police Turn up the Heat, Neo-Nazis Build an Electronic Shield,
Associated Press, June 26, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4394533.
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tion resembles more personalized e-mail messages. This is especially true
if the group uses a language, such as German, which is not the common
Net language. Arguably, the effects in this case are linked closely to a cer-
tain country. Consequently, jurisdiction within Germany would be in ac-
cordance with international law.
(c) World Wide Web
The Web, a vast decentralized collection of documents containing
text, visual images, and even audio clips, poses the greatest problems for
international jurisdiction. The Web is designed to be inherently accessible
from every Internet site in the world. Information on a Web page resides
passively on a particular computer until fetched by a human reader. Even
when a Web site's computer can determine the geographical location of
the prospective reader's Internet site, that does not disclose the location of
the human reader. For instance, a Minnesota resident could place a tele-
phone call to an Internet host in Toronto and browse a Web page through
that host without disclosing his Minnesota location. "Given that simple
fact, it is impossible for the owner of a Web site to prevent access by users
in a given jurisdiction."' 10
Even if the distributor of Sports Illustrated Online Swimsuit Edition
is aware that his files are especially attractive for Internet users in Islamic
countries where they might be considered indecent, it seems unreasonable
to subject this distributor to the decency laws of these countries. The link
of the offer to the territory of the regulating State is not obvious. The con-
nection between the regulating State and the distributor is not very con-
vincig. First of all, the distributor will in most cases not even be inter-
ested in having his offer spread to exotic countries without a real demand
for his products. Additionally, the international commununity would not
recognize a State's pure political or ideological interest in regulating the
Internet on a global level.
This might be different where the distributor is targeting a certain
country with extra efforts. A U.S.-based distributor of Nazi material, pro-
hibited in Germany, could post this material on the Net. He could then start
advertising for his Web site by sending flyers indicating how to download
the material via regular mail to Germany. Even under these circumstances,
offering the material on-line for downloading does not exactly resemble
the shipping via regular mail because the sender does not know who pre-
cisely gets access to his material. But with these extra efforts the distribu-
tor targets a certain country as if he were dropping the material from an
110. Eckenwiler, supra note 87.
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airplane. Despite the scattering, most material will arrive at its destination.
It seems to be reasonable and justifiable that a country that is targeted
in the described way regulates this conduct, thereby subjecting individuals
to its laws.1I The conduct, however, has to be clearly recognized as crimi-
nal by international standards. So the effects principle might under certain
circumstances even allow jurisdiction over Web site distributors.
In a U.S. case of targeting, Panavision International, L.P. v. Toep-
pen,"2 the California federal court used an "effects" analysis to determine
that it had jurisdiction over an Illinois defendant who used a California
company's trademark in a Web site address for the purpose of extorting
money. The defendant allegedly searched for trademarks that had not been
registered as Internet domain names, registered such trademarks himself,
and then demanded money to relinquish his rights. 3
The court determined that general jurisdiction did not exist over the
defendant; he was domiciled in Illinois, and he only travelled to California
twice a year.14 The court found that his activities were not "substantial,
systematic, or continuous.""
5
Regarding specific jurisdiction, the court used a three-part test:
(1) [t]he nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some
transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purpose-
fully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the fo-
rum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws[;] (2)
[t]he claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defen-
dant's forum-related activities [; and] (3) [e]xercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable.
116
In determining that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the
forum, the court first looked at the nature of the cause of action. It decided
that tort theory and an "effects test" should be used, rather than contract
theory."7 The court decided to examine the effects of the defendant's al-
leged actions because of his intentional targeting of a California company.
111. Cf. INTERNAIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 58, at 45:
extraterritorial regulatory measures generally should be permissible only where both foreign
conduct and its effects are constituent elements of the activity to which the national law ap-
plies; where the effects within the territory are substantial; and where the effects are a direct
and primarily intended result of the foreign conduct.
112. Panavision Int'l, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
113. Id. at 619.
114. Id. at 620.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 620 (quoting Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
117. Id. at621.
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The court referred to Data Disk, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc.,'18 in
which the court looked at whether communications were intended to cause
injury in California.119 It stated that the defendant intended to interfere with
the plaintiff's business, knowing that the injury would be borne in Califor-
nia, and "expressly aimed his conduct at California."'20 The court distin-
guished several Internet-related cases"' because they dealt with defendants
who had "legitimate businesses and legitimate legal disputes"; by contrast,
the defendant was merely "running a scam directed at California.
1 22
The court used a "but for" standard for the second part of the test to
find that the defendant would not have been injured but for defendant's
registration of the trademarks.12 For its analysis of the third prong of the
test, the court referred to seven factors124 for measuring whether jurisdic-
tion would comport with "fair play and substantial justice.' ' 25 The court
held, under a tort theory, that jurisdiction over the defendant was pre-
sumptively reasonable because he had aimed his activities at California
residents. 126 Because the defendant failed to overcome the presumption of
reasonableness, the court held that the third prong of the test was met.1
27
The reasoning of the court is persuasive, and it would be equally per-
suasive in an international case. Extorting money from the owner of a
118. Data Disk, 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977). For further discussion, see infra Part
II.B.2.a.
119. Panavision Int'l., 938 F. Supp. at 621.
120. Id.; cf CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 965 F. Supp. 17, 20 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(holding that when a declaratory judgment plaintiff registered domain name that happened
to incorporate defendant's trade name, action was dismissed because claims did not arise
out of defendant's contacts with forum state).
, 121. Panavision Int'l., 938 F. Supp. at 622 (citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, No. 96-9344,1383, 1997 WL S60048 (2d. Cir.
Sept. 10, 1997) (see discussion infra Part II.B.l.d.); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (see discussion infra Part II.B.l.e.); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, 636
So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (see discussion infra Part II.B.l.i.)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The seven factors are as follows:
(1) the extent of defendant's "purposeful" interjection; (2) the burden on defen-
dant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of
the defendant's state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5)
the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the
forum to plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the exis-
tence of an alternative forum.
Id. at 622 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 471 U.S. 462, 476-478 (1985)). The
Court did not address the factors individually. See infra Part II.B.1.f, Part II.B.2.a. for a dis-
cussion of almost identical factors in two other cases.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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trademark has substantial effects in the victim's State. Thus the exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe by this State is reasonable.
d. Protective Principle
The protective principle, found in Restatement section 402(3), allowsS 128
a State to protect its own governmental functions. International law rec-
ognizes the right of a State to punish a limited class of offenses committed
outside its territory by persons who are not its nationals. "Nearly all states
assume jurisdiction over aliens for acts done abroad which affect the secu-
rity of the state ... .,,12' These offenses must be generally recognized as
criminal by the international community. This is the case for offenses like
espionage, counterfeiting of the State's seal or currency, or falsification of
official documents.' 30 Furthermore hackers who play "wargames" and in-
trude in national security data systems, or endanger the systems with
worms13 1 or through other means, face subjection to the jurisdiction of the
affected State.132 Douglas Barnes, a member of the Austin Cyberpunks,
even expects that this principle will be invoked against international soft-
ware piracy rings. 33 The protective principle does not support application
to foreign nationals of laws against political expression.'3 Considerations
of national security, however, helped the House of Lords, in Joyce v. Di-
rector of Public Prosecutions,135 to decide that "an alien who left the
country in possession of a British passport owed allegiance and was guilty
of treason when he subsequently broadcast propaganda for an enemy in
wartime."
131
States are authorized to prescribe rules to outlaw the above men-
128. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 402(3).
129. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (4th ed. 1990).
130. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 402 cmt. f; HENKiN ET AL., supra note 46, at 1082-
84; BUERGENTHAL & MAIER, supra note 46, at 169.
131. A worm is "a usually small self-contained computer program that invades comput-
ers on a network and usually performs a malicious action." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 1364 (10th ed. 1996).
132. Cf. Kandan & Em, supra note 29 (explaining that Malaysia's proposed Computer
Crimes Bill intends to prevent mischievous activities such as hacking into computers, im-
planting viruses, and cracking passwords).
133. Douglas Barnes, The Coming Jurisdictional Swamp of Global Internetworking (Or,
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Anonymity) (visited Oct. 24, 1997)
<http://www.communities.com/paper/swamp.html>.
134. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 402 cmt. f.
135. Joyce v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 1946 App. Cas. 347 (appeal taken from Crim.
App.); see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., In-
stalment 8 1985) (citing Joyce, 1946 App.Cas. 347) (discussing the value of this decision as
an international precedent).
136. BROWNLIE, supra note 129.
[Vol. 50
Number 1] INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE 143
tioned crimes in cyberspace. Expatriated citizens, and even aliens who op-
pose a certain regime, cannot be sure that participation in public news
groups is not subject to regulation of their native State. This does not nec-
essarily conflict with international human rights. To the contrary, Article
20 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of December
19, 1966 states:
1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that consti-
tutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.
137
To avoid treaty violations due to different concepts of freedom of speech,
the United States' adherence to international human rights treaties is regu-
larly accompanied by reservations specifying that the treaty should not
promise change in existing U.S. law or practice.
38
e. Universality Principle
Universality provides for jurisdiction over a crime which customary
or conventional law labels so egregious as to be of universal concern. Un-
like the other principles of jurisdiction, universality does not require a di-
rect connection such as the place of the offense, the nationality of the of-
fender, or the effects of the offense on the prescribing State. The required
connection is more abstract. Universal jurisdiction over the specified of-
fenses is a result of universal condemnation of those activities. They are
subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law or as a matter
of international agreements. In the latter case, it remains to be determined
whether universal jurisdiction over a particular offense has become cus-
tomary law for States not party to such an agreement. The doctrine was
developed centuries ago to address the piracy that menaced international
trade and justified its application by deeming the pirate hostes humani
generi-the enemy of all mankind. 139 Meanwhile, section 404 of the Re-
statement correctly reflects the consensus of the international commu-
nity.4o It criminalizes piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of air-
craft, genocide, war crimes, and certain acts of terrorism. One might
137. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 20, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 178.
138. Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
139. Robert Alfert, Jr., Hostes Humani Generis: An Expanded Notion of U.S. Coun-
terterrorist Legislation, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 171 (1992).
140. REsTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 404; see supra text accompanying note 59; see also
Robert Alfert, Jr., supra note 139; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under Inter-
national Laiv, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1988); cf Oxman, supra note 46, at 281; BROWNLIE,
supra note 129, at 305.
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wonder whether any of these crimes might be committed in cyberspace.
However, according to Article I of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948, the following
acts shall be punishable under the universality principle:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide. 141
Whoever cruises the Net for a while will not have many difficulties dis-
covering Web sites which at least give rise to a statutory interpretation of
"[d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide. 142 Especially in re-
gions where war is being waged, it should also be possible to prove that
people are serious about hate messages-that is they really want genocide
to happen. These acts may be outlawed by any State-even without one of
the earlier discussed bases of jurisdiction to prescribe.
The acts listed in Article 1I of the Genocide Convention are also
listed in Article 4, section 3 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia.4 4 Ar-
ticle 7 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia states the
individual responsibility for aiding and abetting in the planning, prepara-
tion, or execution of crimes outlawed by this statute. 44 Thus, violating the
statute not only subjects a perpetrator to the jurisdiction of all member
states of the United Nations, but also to the jurisdiction of the organization
itself.
B. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
Jurisdiction to adjudicate is defined as a State's authority to subject
141. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. III, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
142. "After the Oklahoma City bombing, the Senate terrorism subcommittee immedi-
ately convened hearings on 'The Availability of Bomb-Making Information on the Inter-
net,' at which Senator Dianne Feinstein expressed shock that racist militia organizations
apparently use the Net to distribute 'mayhem manuals' and other bomb-making instruc-
tional material and to spread their doctrines on the 'Cyberhate' World Wide Web site and
other similar outposts." David Post, New Rules for the Net?, AM. LAW. July/Aug. 1995, at
112.
143. United Nations: General's Report on Aspects of Establishing An International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, May 3, 1993, Annex I, art.
4(3), 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1192. [hereinafter Report on Establishing an International Tribunal].
144. Id. at 1194.
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persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals,
whether in civil or in criminal proceedings, whether or not the State is a
party to the proceedings. 45 It requires a sufficient or reasonable relation
with the forum State.146 The Restatement formulates this criteria in section
421 as follows:
(1) A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate
with respect to a person or thing if the relationship of the state to the
person or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reason-
able.
147
The fact that an exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate is reasonable
does not mean that the forum State has jurisdiction to prescribe in respect
to the subject matter of the action. "Conversely, there may be circum-
stances in which a State has jurisdiction to prescribe but jurisdiction to
adjudicate is absent or doubtful."'148 Especially in criminal cases, jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate is rarely exercised in the absence of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe by the same State, because courts rarely apply the criminal laws of
other States.'49
According to subsection (2) of section 421, a state's exercise of juris-
diction to adjudicate is generally reasonable, if at the time jurisdiction is
asserted:
(a) the person or thing is present in the territory of the state, other
than transitorily;
(b) the person, if a natural person, is domiciled in the state;
(c) the person, if a natural person, is resident in the state;
(d) the person, if a natural person, is a national in the state;
(e) the person, if a corporation or comparable juridical person, is or-
ganized pursuant to the law of the state;
(f) a ship, aircraft or other vehicle to which the adjudication relates
is registered under the laws of the state;
(g) the person, whether natural or personal, has consented to the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction;
(h) the person, whether natural or juridical, regularly carries on
business in the state;
(i) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on activity in
the state, but only in respect of such activity;
Ci) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on outside
145. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 401(b).
146. Cf., e.g., BGHZ 115, 90; Mann, supra note 83, at 32; Born, supra note 45.
147. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 421(1).
148. Id. § 421 cmt. a.
149. Oxman, supra note 46, at 278; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 422(1) ("A
court in the United States may try a person only for violation of United States law, not for
violation of the penal law of a foreign state.").
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the state an activity having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect within the state, but only in respect of such activity; or
(k) the thing that is the subject of adjudication is owned, possessed,
or used in the state, but only in respect of a claim reasonably
connected with that thing.150
In international criminal cases, jurisdiction to adjudicate depends almost
exclusively on presence of the accused. In international civil cases, the
principle of "actor sequiturforum rer' [Plaintiff follows defendant to the
latter's forum] can be regarded as a principle accepted virtually every-
where.' 5' It is important to note that the international law standard for civil
cases-reasonableness--differs significantly from the U.S. "minimum
contacts" standard, which was crafted in International Shoe v. Washington
and serves as the basis for deciding jurisdictional questions in the U.S.'
52
Transitory presence, for example, is not a sufficient basis for the exercise
of jurisdiction to adjudicate under international law 53 even though "tag"
jurisdiction is in accordance with U.S. law.' 54 One federal court even held
that the temporary presence of a person within the airspace of a state while
on board a commercial aircraft established jurisdiction.5 5 As a matter of
principle, international law requires closer pre-litigation contacts between
the defendant and the forum State than would be necessary in domestic
cases. 56 This is due to the fact that a foreign nation presents a higher sov-
ereignty barrier than another state within the United States. U.S. courts
generally agree upon this concern for other nations' sovereignty.'57
150. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 421(2).
151. ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LMGATION AND THE QUEST FOR REA-
SONABLENESS 46 (1996).
152. International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Id. (emphasis added).
153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 421 cmt. e; see also Convention on Accession to
the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Oct. 9, 1978, 18 I.L.M. 8, 21 (excluding "tag" service as an acceptable basis on
jurisdiction); cf. Born, supra note 45, at 35.
154. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990) (Scalia, J.) ("We do
not know of a single state or federal statute, or a single judicial decision resting upon state
law, that has abandoned in-state service as a basis of jurisdiction. Many recent cases reaf-
firm it.").
155. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ("It cannot seriously
be contended that a person moving in interstate commerce is on that account exempt from
service of process while in transit, and we think, it makes no practical difference whether he
is traveling at the time on a plane, or on a bus or train, or in his own car.").
156. Born, supra note 45, at 36.
157. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) ("Great care and
reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the
[Vol. 50
Number 1] INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE 147
International cyberspace cases that call for international law princi-
ples relating to jurisdiction, however, are rare. For guidance, then, we ex-
trapolate from interpretation of the "minimum contacts" standard in do-
mestic cases. That interpretation is a starting point for determining how to
apply "reasonableness" in the international context.
Internet-related questions involving jurisdiction have been most
common in U.S. courts, primarily because of the multijurisdictional char-
acter of the country. U.S. courts have taken various approaches to this ju-
risdictional issue. It is helpful to separate these approaches into two cate-
gories: moderate and expansive. The moderate approach is more consistent
with the "reasonableness" standard of international law and is a better
model for international multijurisdictional cases.
1. Moderate Approach
Nine domestic courts so far have taken a moderate approach that is
consistent with an international "reasonableness" standard. One court re-
fused to find jurisdiction based solely on the existence of a Web site where
it was not established that the Web site was accessed by citizens of the fo-
rum state.158 Another court refused to find jurisdiction where the contents
of a Web site were unrelated to the cause of action.9 In the other seven
cases, the accessibility of a Web site within the state was not an adequate
basis for jurisdiction.'6 In two out of these seven cases, jurisdiction based
solely on Internet advertising was denied.161 In four cases, more than Inter-
net advertising was involved. The courts upheld jurisdiction because of
international field. ... ") (quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404
(1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see, e.g., Gates Leariet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325,
1333 (9th Cir. 1984); FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.
1987); Sinatra v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988).
158. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1358 (W.D. Ark. 1997). For fur-
ther discussion of this case, see infra Part lI.B.l.a.
159. McDonough v. Fallon McElligot, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826 (S.D. Cla.
1996). For further discussion of this case, see infra Part II.B.l.b.
160. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff'd, No. 96-9344, 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); CompuServe,
Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS
Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996); Resuscitation Tech., Inc., v. Continental
Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S, 1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997);
Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One,
Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). For further discussion of
these cases, see infra Parts Il.B.c-i, respectively.
161. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097; Bensusan Restaurant, 937 F. Supp. 295.
162. CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257; EDIAS Software Int'l, 947 F. Supp. 413; Resuscitation
Tech., 1997 W 148567; Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399.
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numerous intentional contacts to the forum state. In a final case, jurisdic-
tion was denied where the only contact with the forum state was the loca-
tion of a database.'63
a. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
In a domestic case with an international twist, an Arkansas federal
court refused to find jurisdiction over a Chinese company based on an on-
line advertisement. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.'6 involved liability
for wrongful death from a house fire allegedly caused by a Christmas tree.
The Chinese company manufactured the trees and distributed them to an
Arkansas company. The plaintiffs claimed in part that the defendant had
significant contacts with Arkansas through Internet advertising. 6' The de-,
fendant's advertisement was contained in an on-line Hong Kong trade
magazine and the distributor received a monthly hard copy of the maga-
zine. The defendant claimed that its name was not part of the Internet ad-
dress and that the advertisement was not directed toward Arkansas and
probably never even found its way to Arkansas.' 66 The court agreed with
the defendant's additional assertion that a finding of jurisdiction would re-
sult in worldwide jurisdiction. Citing CompuServe'67 and Zippo Manufac-
161turing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., the court stated that the alleged con-
tact with Arkansas was insufficient because the defendant did not contract
to sell goods or services to any state citizens over the Internet.169
It would have been clearly out-of-bounds for the judge to base juris-
diction on a Web site that was probably never even accessed by Arkansas
citizens. The more interesting question, therefore, is whether evidence of
access by a forum state, and, in turn, prospective plaintiffs is a workable
test for jurisdiction.
b. McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc.
In McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 7° a California federal court
held that the existence of a public Web site used by Californians could not,
163. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d 1351.
164. Smith, 968 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
165. Id. at 1363.
166. Id. at 1364.
167. CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257. For further discussion of this case, see infra Part
II.B.l.e.
168. Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. 1119. For further discussion of this case, see infra Part
II.B.2.e.
169. Smith, 968 F. Supp. at 1365.
170. McDonough, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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by itself, establish jurisdiction. The plaintiff, a California sports photog-
rapher, sued Missouri defendants on copyright claims for reproducing a
photo of basketball player Charles Barldey for use in a magazine and sub-
mission to a national advertising awards contest.' The plaintiff argued
that the Web site's accessibility by Californians allowed him to sue the de-
fendant for issues wholly unrelated to the content of the Web site. This ar-
gument, however, was rejected. 73 The Court stated, "because the Web en-
ables easy world-wide access, allowing computer interaction via the [W]eb
to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the
personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists."' 74 Also, the defen-
dants' alleged contacts with California-advertising, the use of independ-
ent contractors, and nationwide distribution of the magazine-were not
sufficiently related to the reproduction of the photo to warrant personal ju-
risdiction. 75
In fact, a contrary decision, if applied on the international level,
would have disturbing consequences for the international order-and the
domestic case load-if any foreign company could be haled into a U.S.
court based simply on the accessibility of its Web site. No U.S. company
with a Web site could complain then, if as a countermove, it found itself
subjected to some exotic jurisdiction on the other side of the world, even if
its business was a Mom-and-Pop convenience store servicing a six block
radius in Smalltown, America.
c. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger
In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,176 the New York federal court op-
posed nationwide jurisdiction over the Internet as contradicting traditional
notions of fair play. The plaintiff, owner of Esquire magazine, sued a New
Jersey attorney for using the Internet domain name, "ESQWIRE.COM," to
advertise legal information services to New Yorkers. The services were not
yet available at the time of the advertising. The Web site was accessible to,
and visited by, New Yorkers. 7 7 Expressly declining to follow other courts'
171. Id. at 1828.
172. Id. at 1827.
173. Id at 1829.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1828-29; cf. IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1288
(N.D. El. 1997) ("It cannot plausibly be argued that any defendant who advertises nation-
ally could expect to be haled into court in any state, for a cause of action that does not relate
to the advertisements.").
176. Hearst, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL)(AJP), 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
177. Id. at *4.
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more expansive notions of jurisdiction over the Internet, the court stated:
Where, as here, defendant has not contracted to sell or actually sold
any goods or services to New Yorkers, a finding of personal jurisdiction in
New York based on an Internet web site would mean that there would be
nationwide (indeed, worldwide) personal jurisdiction over anyone and eve-
ryone who establishes an Internet Web site. Such nationwide jurisdiction is
not consistent with traditional personal jurisdiction case law nor acceptable
to the Court as a matter of policy.179
The court likened the defendant's Web site to a national magazine
advertisement that targeted New York, which would be insufficient to es-
tablish jurisdiction."' Likewise, "ESQWIRE" e-mails sent to New York
residents were insufficient because they were analogous to letters or tele-
phone calls. Is1 Jurisdiction for a tortious act committed in New York did
not exist because the alleged "offer for sale" was posted on the Internet,182 .. .
and was not made within the state. Neither did jurisdiction exist for a tort
committed from outside the state because the defendant did not derive
enough revenue from New York.'83
The Hearst court obviously saw the international implications of a
contrary decision. It wanted to avoid setting a precedent that would permit
international jurisdiction over operators of foreign Web sites in every dis-
pute involving New York residents.
d. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King
Although Bensusan Restaurant Corporation v. King'84 differs factu-
ally from Hearst, the two are similar because jurisdiction in New York was
denied in both. In Hearst, New Yorkers were likely to be interested in the
advertised services, although these services were not yet available. In Ben-
susan, by contrast, few New Yorkers were likely to be interested in flying
to Missouri for an evening in a jazz club.
The New York federal court in Bensusan held that the creation of a
178. Id. at *20. The court cited three cases discussed infra Part H.B.2.: Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996); and Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
179. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *1; see also Naxos Resources (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Southam
Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. 2265 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that publication via the Internet,
LEXIS, and WESTLAW should not make a party vulnerable to jurisdiction in every state).
180. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *10.
181. Id. at*12.
182. Id. at* 13.
183. Id. at *15.
184. Bensusan Restaurant, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd No. 96-9344, 1383,
1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
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Web site, without more, was not sufficient for personal jurisdiction.1 5 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated its trademark for a New York
jazz club, "The Blue Note," by using the name for his Missouri club and
posting a similar logo and information about the club on a Web site with186
unrestricted access. 1To obtain tickets to the club, a person would call the
Missouri telephone number listed on the Web site and pick up the tickets
in Missouri. Thus, except for accessing the Web site, the whole transac-
tion would occur in Missouri. Refusing to extend the "stream of com-
merce" concept,188 the court stated, "[c]reating a site, like placing a product
into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even world-
wide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the
forum state."'89 The court found that the creation of the Web site did not
amount to targeting New York for business: "The mere fact that a person
can gain information on the allegedly infringing product is not the equiva-
lent of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise making an ef-
fort to target its product in New York."'19 Bensusan distinguished Com-
puServe, Inc. v. Patterson,19' in which an Internet user "specifically
targeted" Ohio by subscribing to a network service based there, entering
into a separate agreement with the service to market his software, adver-
tising through the service, and sending his software to the service.1
92
Bensusan, as well as Hearst, reflects a cautious judicial approach
which seems to have not only domestic, but also international multijuris-
dictional, cases in mind.
e. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson93 goes a step beyond McDonough,
Hearst and Bensusan because it describes a factor needed beyond the mere
185. Id. at 301.
186. Id. at 297.
187. Id.
188. Lori I. Bauman, Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Advertising, THE COMPUTER
LAW., Jan. 1997, at 4 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102
(1992)).
189. Bensusan Restaurant, 937 F. Supp. at 301; see also Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah
Medical Products, Inc., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 1997)
(finding that Internet advertisement for medical goods did not constitute purposeful avail-
ment of New York where customers were given a nationwide telephone number to contact
the company).
190. Bensusan Restaurant, 937 F. Supp. at 299.
191. CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). For further discussion of this case, see
infra Part II.B. 1.e.
192. CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257.
193. Id.
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existence of computer communications for personal jurisdiction: a con-
tract. The Sixth Circuit allowed an out-of-state subscriber to be sued in
Ohio because of his electronic communications directed toward the state.
The defendant, who owned a software company and lived in Texas,
contracted with the Ohio-based CompuServe to market his software to
other CompuServe subscribers nationwide. 194 The agreement was entered
into in Ohio and was subject to Ohio law. 195 The defendant transferred
thirty-two software files to CompuServe and advertised them on the sys-
tem. 96 When CompuServe began to market similar software on-line, the
defendant accused the company of trademark infringement.'9
In its jurisdictional analysis, the court determined that the defendant
had purposefully availed himself of the state through three years of re-
peated contacts with the state and his use of CompuServe both to provide
and market his software in Ohio and elsewhere.'98 The court also stated:
Admittedly, merely entering into a contract with CompuServe would
not, without more, establish that Patterson had minimum contacts with
Ohio. By the same token, Patterson's injection of his software product
into the stream of commerce, without more, would be at best a dubious
ground for jurisdiction. Because Patterson deliberately did both of
those things, however, and because of the other factors that we discuss
herein, we believe that ample contacts exist to support the assertion of
jurisdiction in this case, and certainly an assertion of jurisdiction by
the state where the computer network service in question is headquar-
tered. 199
The court concluded:
[Defendant] has knowingly made an effort-and, in fact, purposefully
contracted-to market a product in other states, with Ohio-based
CompuServe operating, in effect, as his distribution center. Thus, it is
reasonable to subject [him] to suit in Ohio, the state which is home to
the computer network service he chose to employ.
2
00
Consistent with its holding that computer communications alone
were insufficient to warrant jurisdiction, the court declined to extend its
holding of jurisdictional sufficiency to, for example, an Ohio suit by Com-
puServe against a "regular subscriber" living in another state "even if the
subscriber is a native Alaskan who has never left home."20 ' It also declined
194. Id. at 1260.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1261.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1265.
199. Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 1263.
201. Id. at 1268.
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to extend the holding to a suit in an Ohio court by a party from a third state
over a computer virus, or to a suit in any state where the defendant's soft-
ware was purchased or used.m
This well-reasoned decision, which does not overemphasize elec-
tronic contacts, might also be a model for international multijurisdictional
cases.
f EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd.
In a similar case, the Arizona federal court in EDIAS Software Inter-
national, L.L.C. v. BASIS International Ltd.20 established jurisdiction in a
defamation action. In its analysis of defamation allegations under the first
part of an "effects" test similar to that in California Software,204 the court
stated:
The Central District of California concluded that a similar allegedly li-
belous statement circulated in a computer forum established jurisdic-
tion based on the foreseeable injury felt in the forum state. This
court... agrees... that [defendant] should not be permitted to take
advantage of modem technology through an Internet Web page and fo-
.. . 205
rum and simultaneously escape traditional notions of jurisdiction.
Regarding the second part of the test, the court found that allegedly
defamatory statements posted on the Web page, a contractual relationship
between the parties, and the defendant's contract-related activities in Ari-
zona constituted purposeful availment.2° Of the seven reasonableness
factors which the court used, as in California Software,207 the second and
third factors are the most important in the context of international jurisdic-
tion. Although the court basically treated the case as a domestic one, it
recognized the jurisdictional conflicts resulting from a foreign defendant in
a U.S. court. The court looked at the burden of defendant to litigate in Ari-
zona, noting that the distance a foreign defendant must travel and its un-
•• 208
familiarity with laws should be considered. It determined that the defen-
dant would not have to travel far, apparently because the defendant had
signed the contract in New Mexico and agreed to be subject to New Mex-
202. Id.; cf State v. Interactive Gaming & Comm. Corp., No. CV97-7808, (Mo. Cir. Ct.
May 23, 1997) (on-line offer to provide gambling services in exchange for payment of a
registration fee was accepted in Missouri, causing a contract within the state).
203. EDLAS Software Int'l, 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
204. California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal.
1986). For further discussion of this case, see infra Part 13.B.2.a.
205. EDIAS Software Int'l, 947 F. Supp. at 420 (citation omitted).
206. Id. at 417-21.
207. Califomia Software, 631 F. Supp. 1356. For further discussion of this case, see in-
fra Part 3.B.2.a.
208. EDIAS Software Int'l, 947 F. Supp. at 421.
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ico law. The court also decided that the defendant would be sufficiently
familiar with federal law. Although the court ultimately found that the
third factor, involving sovereignty conflicts, was not a bar to the exercise
of jurisdiction, it acknowledged that such conflicts can arise when a defen-
dant resides in a foreign country.M The court stated, "[s]overeignty issues
arise when a defendant resides in a foreign country such that concerns
about conflicts with the home State's sovereignty relate to the possible re-
sults of litigation. 210 Therefore, in an international case, the result could
have been different under the same facts and in the same forum.
The first factor of the court's "reasonableness" test-the purposeful
availment factor-was of the most substantive importance to the court:
"[t]he visits and the many phone, fax, and e-mail communications that
[defendant] made to Arizona, in addition to... invoices.., sent to Ari-
zona, and the allegedly defamatory statements indicate that [defendant]
purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Arizona."
211
The court resolved the fourth factor, Arizona's interest in adjudicat-
ing the dispute, in favor of the plaintiff. It pointed to the plaintiff's local
address; defendant's knowledge of the address; and other activity within
the state, including billing, receiving payment, visiting plaintiff, and con-
tacting plaintiff by telephone, fax, and e-mail.212 Regarding the last three
factors relating to the efficiency, convenience, and importance of the fo-
rum and the existence of an alternate forum, the court determined that Ari-
zona would be most convenient for the plaintiff, although New Mexico
213
was an alternate forum.
Not all of the policy considerations are convincing on the interna-
tional level. However, the intentional contacts of the defendant with the
forum state went beyond fortuitous communication on the Internet and
reached a level that justifies the exercise of jurisdiction.
g. Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care
Corp.
As opposed to EDIAS, where the defendant visited the forum state,
the Indiana federal court in Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental
209. Id. at 421-22.
210. Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Indus., Co., v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 102-3
(1987)).
211. Id. at 421; see also Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 47 n.8 (D. Conn. 1997)
(finding that out-of-state defendant's e-mail messages and telephone calls to plaintiff in
Connecticut were sufficient purposeful minimum contacts).
212. EDIAS Software Int'l, 947 F. Supp. at 422.
213. Id.
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Health Care Corp.21 4 had to resolve jurisdiction based more strongly on
on-line communications. Multiple communications across state lines-e-
mail, phone, and fax-were enough to satisfy an Indiana federal court that
direct communications, rather than those involving third parties, were at
issue in jurisdiction over the defendant. The defendants learned about the
plaintiff, a start-up Indiana company in need of capital, through its Web
site. The defendants requested information via e-mail, and a flurry of cor-
respondence ensued, including eighty e-mail messages.215 Additionally,
two meetings were held in other states. The parties were negotiating a joint
venture calculated to satisfy a creditor of the plaintiff and make an initial
216public offering in return for acquisition of patent rights. The parties
signed confidentiality agreements during the negotiations. When the nego-
tiations soured and the defendants refused to be bound by the confidential-
ity agreements, the plaintiff brought a declaratory action for lack of a con-
tractual relationship, breach of the confidentiality agreements, tortious
interference, and conversion.
217
The court examined whether the defendants had transacted business
in Indiana. It stated:
[T]his notion of transacting business over the Internet involves exam-
ining the level of interactivity, and the commercial nature of the ex-
change of information that occurs. The quality of those electronic
contacts is measured with reference to the intended object of that ac-
tivity .... [Especially when] the dispute is about whether or not a con-
tract was formed between two parties by reason of their use of the In-
ternet or other electronic transmissions.... [A]... factual inquiry...
requires a direct examination of the nature and content of... Internet
communications ....218
The'court focused not on "who started it,"'219 but on the level of Internet
activity involved. It opined that "one or two inquiries about some Indiana
goods or services would not support local jurisdiction., 2 0 In this case,
however, a continuing and long-term relationship was contemplated. As a
consequence, the e-mail messages were numerous and continuous over a
214. Resuscitation Tech., No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S, 1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24,
1997).
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *2-3.
218. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). The court crafted its "nature and content" language
based on other Internet case opinions. Id. (citing CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d
1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (see discussion supra Part II.B.l.e); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Penn. 1997) (see discussion infra Part II.B.2.e); and
EDIAS Softvare Int'l, 947 F. Supp. 413 (see discussion supra Part II.B.l.f)).
219. Id. at *5.
220. Id. at *6.
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period of months.22'
222Citing Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc. for its
"intended object" analysis,223 the court found that the initial Internet so-
licitation and e-mail response, and the ensuing communications were fo-
cused on Indiana and showed that the defendant's "intended objects" of the
contacts were "to transact business and develop the business" in Indiana.224
Furthermore, the plaintiff's cash-poor status made it more difficult to
travel for litigation. The court made a policy decision to adjudicate dis-
putes involving small, in-state companies seeking capital so that such
companies would not have to fear litigation in other states.
Similar to CompuServe, this court did not overvalue the electronic
contacts, but rather seemed to base its decision on a bundle of other fac-
tors. The factors included signed agreements, meetings, faxes, and, par-
ticularly, the contemplation of a long-term relationship to transact business
in the forum state. However, the court's weighing of the ability of poor
plaintiffs to litigate outside the state is pure protectionism and highly
problematic as a legal rule on the international level. It would mean that
every destitute Third World plaintiff who sued an American company
would always have the home court advantage.
h. Hall v. LaRonde
Unlike EDIAS and Resuscitation Technologies, the California court
in Hall v. LaRonde22' was faced with business transactions conducted ex-
clusively over the Internet and telephone lines. The plaintiff provided sales
and technology services for the defendant, a New York company selling
computer software. The parties contracted for continuing obligations, such
as continuing royalty payments to the plaintiff. They had an ongoing rela-
tionship regarding the development of a software module. The plaintiff
performed all services in California and communicated with the defendant
only by e-mail and telephone; he had no other connections with New York.
Under these circumstances, the court was satisfied with electronic contacts
as the basis for a finding of minimum contacts. The court stated, "[t]he
speed and ease of [electronic] communications has increased the number
221. Id.
222. Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. 1119. For further discussion of this case, see infra Part
II.B.2.e.
223. Resuscitation Tech., No. IP 96-1457-C-MIS, 1997 WL 148567, at *4 ("Because the
object of the defendant was to assign passwords and sell its Internet news service to resi-
dents of the forum state, the court found that its intended object was to transact business in
that state.").
224. Id. at *5.
225. Hall, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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of transactions that are consummated without either party leaving the of-
fice. There is no reason why the requisite minimum contacts cannot be
electronic. , z6
Under the facts of this case, the court's decision is sound. In other
cases, though, careful attention must be given to the facts, to prevent find-
ings of worldwide jurisdiction based on the existence of even automatic
electronic communications with a forum state.227
i. Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.
Even the existence of a contract for computer services from a Miami
database was not enough to call a New York company into a Florida court.
In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,22 the New York de-
fendant, a travel agency, negotiated a contract for computer database
services with a Delaware corporation through its New York branch office.
229The contract provided for on-line access to plaintiff s Miami database.
The court analyzed the travel agency's contacts under the minimum
contacts, "arising out of," and fairness considerations of personal jurisdic-
tion. It determined that the transaction was based in New York, not Flor-
ida. Regarding the issue of fairness, the court stated:
Based on the trial court's decision, below, users of such "on-line"
services could be haled into court in the state in which supplier's bill-
ing office and database happen to be located, even if such users, as
here, are solicited, engaged, and serviced entirely instate by the sup-
plier's local representatives. Such a result, in our view, is wildly be-
yond the reasonable expectations of such computer-information us-
ers.
In fact, the contacts to Miami were fortuitous because the database
might even have been located abroad-for tax reasons or cheaper labor-
without necessarily influencing the parties' contractual relationship. Thus,
the court's decision was sound in looking at the basis of the transaction
rather than the source of electronic contacts.
226. Id. at 402.
227. A more troublesome case, for example, is Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43 (D. Conn.
1997), where the court held that four telephone calls and fifteen e-mails to Connecticut es-
tablished sufficient minimum contacts. This made it unnecessary to decide whether defen-
dant's 225 fraudulent messages on Prodigy should be counted as purposeful contacts with
Connecticut. The court avoided the question of whether posting information on a bulletin
board system warranted a finding of jurisdiction.
228. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). For a criticism of this case,
see Michael J. Santisi, Note, Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.: Extending
the Reach of the Long-Arm Statute through the Internet?, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 433 (1995).
229. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353.
230. Id.
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2. Expansive Approach
A hint of international jurisdictional issues central to this analysis
was present in State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.23 1 However, Granite
Gate Resorts was litigated too soon for international issues to arise; the de-
fendants were preparing to operate their computer service from Belize, but
they had not yet done so at the time of suit.
Although such issues were not directly resolved, this court and others
have expanded their jurisdictional reach into cyberspace. The cases dem-
onstrate approaches that move toward a rule calling for jurisdiction over a
defendant in all states based on the accessibility of the defendant's Web
site by users in all states. If this rule was adopted internationally, a defen-
dant would be subject to the jurisdiction and differing laws of every State
worldwide.
a. California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc.
The California federal court in California Software, Inc. v. Reliability
Research, Inc.3 2 exemplifies both a moderate approach and an expansive
approach to jurisdiction. The case involved the effects on a state of a na-
tional bulletin board posting. The defendants wrote messages to three
companies via a bulletin board and communicated with three California
residents via telephone and letter, saying that the plaintiffs' right to market
• . 233
software was in question.
The court took a moderate approach in determining that general ju-
risdiction did not exist due to lack of sufficient contacts with California.
The defendants were not located in California. The corporate defendant did
not have offices or otherwise conduct business within the state except to
communicate with California users through the national bulletin board.
234
The court stated, "[t]he mere act of transmitting information through the
use of interstate communication facilities is not.., sufficient to establish
jurisdiction over the sender."235
The court's decision to find limited jurisdiction over the defendants
was more expansive. It followed a three-part test from Data Disc, Inc. v.
231. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11,
1996) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction), affd sub. nom.,
Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
232. California Software, 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
233. Id. at 1358.
234. Id. at 1360.
235. Id. at 1360; see also Naxos Resources (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Southam Inc., 24 Media L.
Rep. 2265, 2267 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1996) (quoting California Software, 631 F. Supp. at
1360) (disseminating articles via the Internet, LEXIS, and WESTLAW is not sufficient to
establish general jurisdiction).
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Systems Technology Associates, Inc.,2 6 a case that dealt with the effect of a
long-distance telephone call. Under the first part of the test, which looks at
a defendant's "purposeful availment" of the forum state, the court chose to
look at whether the defendants intended to cause injury in California. It
stated, "[d]efendants made tortious statements which, though directed at
third persons outside California, were expressly calculated to cause injury
in California."'237 Regarding whether the defendant engaged in a "forum-
related activity"-the second part of the test-the court found that
"intentional 'manipulation' of third persons who thereby refrain from con-
summating a contemplated transaction in California" was sufficient.2 8 The
court stated:
Unlike communication by mail or telephone, messages sent through
computers are available to the recipient and anyone else who may be
watching. Thus, while modem technology has made nationwide com-
mercial transactions simpler and more feasible, even for small busi-
nesses, it must broaden correspondingly the permissible scope of juris-
diction exercisable by the courts.
239
The court looked at the third part of the test, a seven-factored
"reasonableness , 240 test.241
Most significantly under this "reasonableness" analysis, the court
found that the defendants had "purposefully injected themselves into Cali-
fornia through third parties [even though they] did not induce reliance in
236. Data Disc, 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977).
237. California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1361; see also Naxos Resources, 24 Media L.
Rep. at 2267 (holding that Canadian defendants purposefully availed themselves of doing
business in California where newspapers were published on LEXIS, which is available to
Californians, and distributed in California).
238. California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1362; cf. Naxos Resources, 24 Media L..Rep.
at 2268 (holding that limited jurisdiction was unavailable because the forum state was not
the focus of the newspaper story and the harm suffered).
239. California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1363.
240. This test is a domestic standard, distinct from the international law
"reasonableness" standard.
241. The factors of the test are as follows:
(A) the extent of the purposeful interjection into the forum state;
(3) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum;
(C) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of defendant's state;
(D) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute;
(E) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;
(F) the importance of the forum to plaintiff's interest in convenient and effec-
tive relief; and
(G) the existence of an alternative forum.
California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1363 (citations omitted).
An allegedly libelous article published in a print magazine and disseminated worldwide was
not enough for the 9th Circuit to hale Swedish scholars into California under the same
seven-factor test. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1993).
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California itself through the [computer] message. '242
The first part of the Data Disc test is workable because of the court's
focus on whether there was express intent to cause injury within the juris-
diction. The second part of the test, however, is too expansive because of
the lack of foreseeability. Any defendant who posts information on the In-
ternet could be seen as engaging a potentially vast audience in a "forum-
related activity" within the states. The third part of the test-the
"reasonableness" factors-is problematic because it allows a court to in-
voke jurisdiction under a host of different factual situations, using broad
discretion. In the international context, any State wishing to protect its na-
tionals could decide that jurisdiction existed under these factors. For in-
stance, the burden on the defendant could routinely be given less weight
than the State's interest in deciding the case. Only if the question of a de-
fendant's "purposeful interjection" into the State were limited to commu-
nications directed toward a particular jurisdiction would a State have less
than complete worldwide jurisdiction. In the international context, States
treat each other as equal sovereigns, and they collectively determine inter-
national law. Thus, it is unlikely that States will agree upon such a vague
formula when the interests of their nationals are at stake.
b. Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.
In Digital Equipment Corp. v. AltaVista Technology, Inc.,243 the Mas-
sachusetts federal court used a moderate approach to find jurisdiction
based on more than a contract; in dicta, it took a more expansive approach
on the issue of jurisdiction based on Web site advertising alone. After the
plaintiff bought a California defendant's rights to the trademark
"AltaVista" and then licensed back certain rights, the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant for infringement. The licensing contract included a Massachusetts
choice-of-law clause.244 Additionally, the defendant's Web site was acces-
sible to Massachusetts residents, the defendant advertised and solicited
sales through the Web site, and the defendant made at least three sales to
Massachusetts residents, and the alleged infringement occurred on the
Web site.245 The court rejected the argument that the defendant's advertis-
ing was only general, and not directed toward Massachusetts residents; it
concluded that the Web site was integral to the contract with the Massa-
246
chusetts company and to the cause of action.
242. California Software, 631 F. Supp. at 1364.
243. Digital Equip., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997).
244. Id. at 463.
245. Id. at 464.
246. Id. at 466-67.
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The court stated:
I cannot ignore the fact that the medium through which many of the
significant Massachusetts contacts occurred is anything but traditional;
it is a site in cyberspace, a Web-site....
The Internet has no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Ger-
trude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not only is there per-
haps "no there there," the "there" is everywhere where there is Internet
access. When business is transacted over a computer network via a
Web-site accessed by a computer in Massachusetts, it takes place as
much in Massachusetts, literally or figuratively, as it does any-
where ....
... To impose traditional territorial concepts on the commercial
uses of the Internet has dramatic implications, opening the Web user
up to inconsistent regulations throughout fifty states, indeed, through-
out the globe.
247
Under a "due process" analysis, the court -found that the claim arose
out of Massachusetts through the contract and subsequent maintenance of
the Web site.248 It also determined that the defendant purposefully availed
itself of Massachusetts by violating the plaintiff's rights with a Web site
that it knew would "plainly... attract Massachusetts residents."' 249 Finally,
the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable because the defendant's travel
would not be overly burdensome, Massachusetts had an interest because
the trademark infringement occurred there, the venue was convenient to
the plaintiff, and the parties had agreed to a choice-of-law provision. 0 The
court additionally stated:
[I]t... troubles me to force corporations that do business over the In-
ternet, precisely because it is cost-effective, to now factor in the po-
tential costs of defending against litigation in each and every state....
On the other hand, it is also troublesome to allow those who conduct
business on the Web to insulate themselves against jurisdiction in
every state, except in the state (if any) where they are physically lo-
cated."S
In dicta, the court indicated how it would rule on a jurisdictional
question involving only advertising on a Web site. Importantly, it stated
that the defendant's knowledge of the Web site's accessibility to Massa-
chusetts residents was sufficient to show that the site was directed toward
247. Id. at 462-63.
248. Id. at 467.
249. Id. at 470; cf. Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D. Conn. 1997) (holding that
where defendant posted messages via Prodigy specifically to plaintiff, the court could find
jurisdiction based on telephone calls and e-mails, choosing not to address whether the
Prodigy messages were "purposeful contacts" with Connecticut).
250. Id. at 470-71.
251. Id. at471.
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them. It stated that the defendant had continuous contacts with the state
through the Web site's twenty-four hour availability to Massachusetts
residents. Furthermore, the court noted that software sold to Massachusetts
residents could be transmitted directly through the Internet.252
Despite the court's concern over possible worldwide jurisdiction, it
set a dangerous precedent. Obviously, the court overlooked the fact that
resolutions to such complex problems are not simply black or white. Com-
promise solutions, as evidenced by other court decisions, are possible be-
tween the extremes of permitting worldwide jurisdiction based solely on
Internet advertising, and denying jurisdiction in forum states other than
where the defendant is physically located.
c. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.
An even more expansive approach was taken in a case involving a
public Web site which advertised, but did not sell, gambling services. In
State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,25' the Minnesota District Court found
gambling advertising on a Web site was aimed at residents in Minnesota,
where gambling is illegal. The defendant corporation was formed in Ne-
vada and the gambling service had not yet been activated at the time of the
suit, but the defendants' intent was to offer the service from a server lo-
cated in Belize.2
If the Attorney General had waited until the server was operational,
the case would have involved international law issues central to this analy-
sis.25' Although the business had been set up in Nevada, a state that allows
gambling, the defendants were planning to run the operation from Belize.
The defendants, therefore, wanted to run a foreign business for purposes of
U.S. law. This indicates that they believed international laws to be more
favorable to its business interests, and to the outcome of U.S. litigation.
The court conducted a traditional domestic personal jurisdiction
analysis. Regarding the quality of the defendants' contacts with Minne-
256
sota, the court discussed Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., in
which the court found jurisdiction in Connecticut because advertising and
252. Id. at 469.
253. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11,
1996), affd sub. nom., Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1997).
254. Id. at *2.
255. Interestingly, the court in State v. Interactive Gaming & Communications Corp.,
No. CV97-7808 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1997) spared the Grenada corporation by treating
the parent company as its alter ego, thereby avoiding international complications.
256. Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). For further discussion of this case,
see infra Part l1.B.2.f.
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dissemination of a toll-free number via the Internet was available in all
states, including Connecticut.2 5 7 The court in Minnesota stated:
[Tihe computer hits on Defendants' Web sites and the fact that the ad-
vertisements give consumers phone numbers to call, along with the
fact that the Court has determined WagerNet's mailing list includes
Minnesota residents, are more than sufficient evidence that Defendants
have made a direct marketing campaign to the State of Minnesota.
Therefore, it is not unforeseen nor unreasonable to Defendants to be
required to come to Minnesota to defend themselves particularly when
the Defendants have said that they have the option for any of the cus-
tomers of WagerNet with whom they have a dispute to sue them in
Minnesota.
258
In response to the defendants' argument that Minnesota residents, not they,
made the illegal computerized gambling transmissions, the court analo-
gized Playboy Enterprises,25 9 in which responsibility was placed on a com-
puter service for inviting users to download images onto their computers.2
The court found that the nature and quality of defendants' contacts
were sufficient because the defendants maintained a Web site for the pur-
pose of soliciting business from Internet users, including Minnesota resi-
dents. 26 1 Furthermore, the Minnesota Attorney General had the right to pur-
sue violations involving gambling solicitations of in-state residents. 262 The
court found that a consumer fraud action involving Minnesota residents
could only lie in Minnesota and was appropriate because the defendants
"crossed the Minnesota borders through Internet advertisements." 26 Also,
Minnesota was more convenient than Belize; the defendants told their
customers that they were subject to suit in either their home states or Be-
lize.2 4
Finally, defendants had minimum contacts with the state due to their
continuous advertisement on the Internet and their notice to prospective
customers of suits in their home forum or in Belize.2 6
The court took an expansive approach in determining that the defen-
dants had sufficient contacts with Minnesota because Minnesota residents
257. Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 WL 767431, at *7.
258. Id.
259. Playboy Enter., Inc., v. Chuckleberry Publ'g., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). For further discussion of this case, see supra Part II.A.2.c.(1)(b).
260. Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 WL 767431, at *9.
261. Id. at *10.
262. Id. at *11.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. Probably, the court was enraged by the overreaching forum clause, calling it the
"coup de grace."
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accessed their Web site. By contrast, in California Software, Inc., v. Reli-
ability Research, Inc.216 the defendants conveyed information to third par-
ties for the specific purpose of harming the plaintiffs. Here, residents could
download information directly from the defendants' Web site without the
defendants' specific intent to target them.
It is questionable whether the mere accessibility of a Web site has the
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within this jurisdiction which is
required by section 421(2)0) of the Restatement. At least on the interna-
tional level, it is not sufficient for a State to simply refer to the nature of
the Internet as a way of decreasing the requirements for a reasonable exer-
cise of jurisdiction:
The Defendants attempt to hide behind the Internet and claim that they
mailed nothing in Minnesota, sent nothing to Minnesota, and never
advertised in Minnesota. This argument is not sound in the age of cy-
berspace. Once the Defendants place an advertisement on the Internet,
that advertisement is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365
days a year to any Internet user until the Defendants take it off the In-
ternet.
This accessibility argument might even justify jurisdiction over the editor
of the Sports Illustrated Online Swimsuit Edition in courts of any Islamic
country with strict decency rules, if two of the top 500 users are from the
forum state.268
d. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation
269In Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, the District of Columbia
federal court seemed to be more inclined to follow Inset Systems270 over
Bensusan27' in finding personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition case between two charities. It
pointed to a newspaper advertisement published in the Washington Post
and "the defendant's home page on the Internet, which is always available
to District residents. 272 The defendant relied on Bensusan, the decision of
266. California Software, 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1986). For further discussion of
this case, see supra Part II.B.2.a.
267. Granite Gate Resorts, 1996 WL 767431, at *6.
268. See id. at *9.
269. Heroes, 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
270. Inset Sys., Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). For
further discussion of this case, see infra Part II.B.2.f.
271. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd No.
96-9344, 1383, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997). For further discussion of this
case, see supra II.B. .d.
272. Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5.
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273
a New York federal district court. The court noted that the Connecticut
federal court in Inset Systems took the opposite view.274 It concluded:
Because the defendant's home page is not the only contact before the
Court... the Court need not decide whether the defendant's home
page by itself subjects the defendant to personal jurisdiction in the
District. In weighing the importance of this particular contact, how-
ever, the Court notes that the defendant's home page explicitly solicits
contributions, and provides a toll-free number for that purpose. The
home page also contains the defendant's allegedly infringing trade-
mark and logo, the subject of the plaintiff's underlying claims. And the
home page is certainly a sustained contact with the District; it has been
possible for a District resident to gain access to it at any time since it
was first posted.
275
Although the court did not directly follow Inset Systems,276 it was in-
fluenced by the reasoning; thus, it is subject to the same criticisms.
e. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.
Unlike in Heroes, the Pennsylvania federal court in Zippo Manufac-
turing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.277 focused on computer advertising and
sales. Contracts with service providers and sales to consumers relating to
Internet usage in Pennsylvania tipped the balance for the court. The manu-
facturer of Zippo lighters sued a California Internet news service for using
domain names such as "zippo.com. ' 278 The defendant had no physical
presence in Pennsylvania, but it operated a Web site advertising its serv-
ices which was accessible to Pennsylvania residents. Additionally, the de-
fendant sold 3,000 passwords over the Internet to state subscribers and
entered into seven contracts with Pennsylvania access providers. a79
The court framed the relevant inquiry: "the likelihood that personal
jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over
the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal
jurisdictional principles. 280
The court classified the case as a "doing business over the Internet"
28
'
273. Id. at 4.
274. Id. at 4-5.
275. Id. at 5.
276. See infra Part I1.B.2.f.
277. Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
.278. Id. at 1121.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1124.
281. Id. at 1125.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
case similar to CompuServe. 82 Regarding purposeful availment, the defen-
dant argued unsuccessfully that it was advertising and merely operating a
Web site and that its contacts were "fortuitous., 283 The court found that the
defendant repeatedly processed residents' applications and assigned pass-
words knowing that this would result in the influx of electronic messages
into Pennsylvania. It concluded that, rather than merely advertising on the
Internet, the defendant was engaging in "electronic commerce."' Fur-
thermore, even though the defendant's sales to Pennsylvania subscribers
constituted only two percent of its total sales, the court concluded that
even one sale would have been sufficient as a forum-related activity. 5 The
court decided that the cause of action arose in Pennsylvania because much
of the alleged infringement, dilution, and injury arose in Pennsylvania,
where the plaintiff was located. Additionally, the exercise of jurisdiction
was reasonable, in the court's view, because Pennsylvania had a strong
interest in resolving suits over trademark infringement of resident corpo-
rations and because the plaintiff's choice of forum was entitled to respect,
especially because the defendant chose to conduct business in Pennsylva-
nia."
The court's guiding principle that jurisdiction depends on the nature
and quality of commercial activity is surely fair and reasonable. However,
applying the principle so that a Web site advertisement and a single sale in
the forum state are sufficient is incompatible with the international
"reasonableness" standard.
f Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.
The Connecticut federal court in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc.87 expanded its jurisdictional reach to out-of-state defendants who ad-
vertised via the Internet. The plaintiff sued the defendant for trademark in-
fringement based on the defendant's use of "Inset" in its Internet domain
address. The defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, had no employees or
288offices in Connecticut, nor did it regularly conduct business there. In
finding jurisdiction over the Massachusetts defendant, the court stated:
[Defendant] has been continuously advertising over the Internet, which
includes at least 10,000 access sites in Connecticut. Further, unlike
282. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). For further discussion
of this case, see supra Part II.B.l.e.
283. Zippo Mfg., 925 F. Supp. at 1126.
284. Id. at 1125-26.
285. Id. at 1127.
286. Id.
287. Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 1996).
288. Id. at 162-63.
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hard-copy advertisements ... , which are often quickly disposed of
and reach a limited number of potential consumers, Intemet adver-
tisements are in electronic printed form so that they can be accessed
again and again by many more potential consumers.
The court concludes that advertising via the Interet is solicita-
tion of a sufficient repetitive nature to satisfy [Connecticut's long-arm
statute] ... .289
It found that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled into
Connecticut court because it directed its advertising activities and its toll-
free number toward all states, including Connecticut.90 Furthermore, the
court found that it was fair to decide the dispute in Connecticut because the
distance between Connecticut and Massachusetts was "minimal." 29'
Under the court's approach, a defendant who advertises via the Inter-
net is subject to jurisdiction in every forum from which users have Internet
access. The concern with distance between the forum state and the defen-
dant's location is of little help in the international context for bordering
states. A citizen of a small country surrounded by many other countries
would be subject to a multitude of jurisdictions. Even on the U.S. level,
this argument would enable a Mexican court in Juarez to hale an El Paso
resident who allegedly violated a Mexican law by posting a message criti-
cizing corruption in the Mexican government. Ironically, under the court's
analysis, the writer of a newspaper article voicing the same criticism might
not be subject to a foreign jurisdiction because of the more limited dis-
semination of hard-copy media.
289. Id. at 164.
290. Id. at 165; but see IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268
(N.D. 11. 1997) (stating general advertising on the Internet was insufficient for jurisdiction
in Illinois where company had no property, was not registered to do business, paid no taxes,
had no offices or employees, and did not make sales or offer services in Illinois).
291. Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165. But see Expert Pagers v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-
VRW, 1997 WL 488011 (N.D. Cal. Aug 6, 1997). In Expert Pages, the copying of a Cali-
fornia plaintiff's copyrighted material was considered direct activity in California which
caused injury within the state. This established minimum contacts in the view of the court.
Id. at *3. Defendant, a "young adult" living in Virginia, allegedly violated plaintiff's copy-
right by maling a copy of its Web site to send disparaging messages to the site's advertisers
and offer a similar service through his own Web site. The court noted that the pro se defen-
dant's business "does not appear to have been terribly successful .... Id. at *4. The court
stated, "In view of his limited contact with California and the overwhelming burden that
defending this case in this district would impose on defendant, the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction in this case would be constitutionally unreasonable." Id. at *5. However, the court
stated: "The smaller the element of purposeful interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be an-
ticipated and the less reasonable is its exercise." Id. at *3 (quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am.
v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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g. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.
Unlike Inset Systems, not even proximity was required in Maritz, Inc.
292
v. Cybergold, Inc. In this trademark action, the Missouri federal court
found personal jurisdiction over a defendant that advertised an upcoming
Internet mailing list service from its California Web site.293 The Web site
was accessed by Missourians 311 times, although 180 of those times were
by the plaintiff.21 The court determined that the defendant's advertise-
ments amounted to purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business
within Missouri, which satisfied the state's long-arm statute.295 In analyz-
ing whether due process was satisfied by an exercise of jurisdiction over
296defendant, the court addressed five factors almost identical in wording to
the five-part test in Granite Gate Resorts. In examining the nature and
quality of the defendant's contacts with Missouri, the court stated:
Although [defendant] characterizes its activity as merely maintaining a
"passive website," its intent is to reach all internet users, regardless of
geographic location.... By analogy, if a Missouri resident would mail
a letter to [defendant] in California requesting information... regard-
ing its service, [defendant] would have the option as to whether to mail
information to the Missouri resident and would have to take some ac-
tive measures to respond to the mail. With [the] website, [defendant]
automatically and indiscriminately responds to each and every Internet
user who accesses its website. Through its website, [defendant] has
consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all Internet
users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally.
2 97
Regarding the quantity of contacts, the court disregarded the plaintiff's
180 contacts with the Web site and found that the defendant had 131 con-
tacts with Missouri users for the purpose of promotion and solicitation. 298
Finally, under the test, the court found that the defendant's posting of in-
formation and act of developing a mailing list was sufficiently related to
plaintiff's trademark claims. 29 The court relied upon California Software'°°
292. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
293. Id. at 1330.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1333.
296. Id. at 1332.
297. Id. at 1333.
298. Id. The court stated that if plaintiffs contacts were to be considered, a plaintiff
could always try to create personal jurisdiction. Thus, the court implicitly followed the line
of reasoning in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("The unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the re-
quirement of contact with the forum State.").
299. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
300. California Software, Inc., v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D.
Cal. 1986). For further discussion of this case, see supra Part ll.B.2.a.
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and Inset Systems 01 in determining that the defendant had purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Missouri by posting in-
formation on the Interet.3°2 It found that jurisdiction over the defendant
did not violate traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice" be-
cause of the state's interest in protecting the trademark of a Missouri cor-
poration and because the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the
forum.
30 3
The Maritz court's theory is overbroad. A country that opposes cer-
tain fiction writers need only point to American jurisprudence such as
Maritz and the memorandum of the Minnesota Attorney General3 4 to in-
dict an American publisher for offering Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses
to its citizens through the Internet. Through a State's efforts to protect its
citizens through a broad exercise of jurisdiction over the Web, it risks ex-
posing its citizens to a whole world of liability.
Even though these cyberspace cases show new fact patterns, solutions
for the problems follow established patterns of legal analysis. Genuine new
questions concerning international jurisdiction to adjudicate would arise if
States instituted virtual courts305 or contented themselves with the virtual
presence of a defendant or accused.
The danger with extensions of jurisdiction that go beyond reasonable
legal limits is that defendants who operate Web sites will take measures to
limit their legal exposure in ways that reduce the flow of information. One
measure would be to install a filter to restrict access to users in certain ju-
- 301. Inset Sys., Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). For
further discussion of this case, see supra Part II.B.2.f.
302. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1334.
303. Id.
304. Minnesota Memorandum, supra note 94. For further discussion of this case, see
supra Part II.A.2.c.(1)(d).
305. But see, e.g., Message posted by cyber-rights@cpsr.org (Mar. 19, 1996) (available
at Cyber-Rights Library) <http:llwww.cpsr.orglcpsr/niilcyber-rights/Library/> (announcing
the Virtual Magistrate Project, which shall assist in the resolution of private computer net-
work disputes). The magistrates will be selected jointly by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation and the Cyberspace Law Institute, both private institutions. The acceptance of these
magistrates in the international network community is, however, uncertain. It is obvious
that States would not recognize the competence of a judicial body consisting exclusively of
nationals from one state or one legal system. Id.; see also Gov't Proposes International
Court to Deal with Internet, THE CHINA POST, May 19, 1997, at 12; cf Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 3 § 1 ("The Court shall consist of fifteen
members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state.") and art. 9 ("At every elec-
tion, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individu-
ally possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the representa-
tion of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should
be assured.").
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risdictions with unfavorable laws.3° Another would be to decline business
.... 307
from users within certain jurisdictions. Yet another would be to post a
notice on the Web site that its use is restricted to users in certain States.30s
A fourth possible measure would be to avoid transmitting data or informa-
tion, such as software, that a court might quantify as "goods" being deliv-
ered into a State.309 Finally, to avoid jurisdiction in courts that would look
at additional contacts with the State beyond Internet activity, defendants
who use the Internet might take care to avoid all other contacts with a State
• • . • 310
to avoid jurisdiction.
Large-scale implementation of these methods and others would con-
flict with the Internet's promise of worldwide information. It would divide
the Worldwide Web into Statewide Webs. And in those States where juris-
dictional rules differ from area to area within borders, such measures
would further divide the Worldwide Web into Local Webs.
3. Universality Principle
The universality principle is not only a legitimate basis for jurisdic-
tion to prescribe. It also allows a State to exercise jurisdiction through its
311
courts to enforce its criminal laws that punish universal crimes. Thus,
netizens who engaged in direct and public incitement to commit genocide
or warcrimes31 by means of computer communications could be haled
worldwide into any court. In the case of violations of the Statute of the In-
r - 313
ternational Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the perpetrator could
even be requested by the International Tribunal. Article 7 of the Statute
states the individual responsibility for aiding and abetting in the planning,
preparation, or execution of crimes outlawed by this statute.1 4 According
306. Robert A. Bourque & Kerry L. Conrad, Avoiding Remote Jurisdiction Based on
Internet Web Site, N.Y. L.J. Dec. 10, 1996, at 1.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 421.
312. In 1983, the CIA, for example, produced a manual entitled Operaciones sicol6gicas
en guerra de guerrillas which taught how to commit warcrimes. The CIA disseminated it to
the so-called contras who fought against the government of Nicaragua. The International
Court of Justice found that the USA thereby encouraged the commission of acts contrary to
general principles of humanitarian law. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 148 (June 27); Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Taught, Then
Dropped, Mental Torture in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at Al1. Posting this
manual on the Net with the intention to make it available to people who use this knowledge
would arguably pass the muster of aiding and abetting in war crimes.
313. Report on Establishing an International Tribunal, supra note 143, at 1192, Annex.
314. Id. Annex, art. 7.
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to Article 9, the International Tribunal and national courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, but the International Tribunal has primacy over the latter
315
ones.
C. Jurisdiction to Enforce
Jurisdiction to enforce deals with a State's authority to induce or
compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regula-
tions, whether through the courts or by use of executive, administrative,
316police, or other nonjudicial action. The U.S: enforcement agencies, in
particular, are starting to enforce national laws on the Internet.3 7 It is
widely assumed that a state may not enforce its rules unless it has jurisdic-
318tion to prescribe those rules. The mere existence of jurisdiction to pre-
scribe, however, is insufficient to justify the state to exercise enforcement
jurisdiction in another state's territory. Especially concerning measures in
aid of enforcement of criminal law, a state's law enforcement officers may
exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the con-
sent of the state, given by duly authorized officials of that state.
39
Enforcement measures requiring consent include not only the physi-
cal arrest of a person, but also, for example, service of subpoena, orders for
production of documents, and police inquiries. 32 Police investigations may
therefore not be mounted on the territory of another State without its con-
sent. The consequences may seem odd for anyone not familiar with the ea-
gerness of States to protect their national sovereignty. Millions of foreign
tourists take pictures of the San Marco Place in Venice and talk to guides.
If the San Marco Place, however, is the scene of a crime, and the FBI
wants to take pictures or talk to witnesses, permission is required. En-
forcement jurisdiction is linked quite closely to the territory. Its limits are
315. Id. Annex, art. 9.
316. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 401(c).
317. Cf FTC Halts Internet Pyramid Scheme, FTC Press Release, May 29, 1997
<http:llwww.ftc.govlopa/9605/fortuna.htn>; DOTAssesses Penaltyfor Advertising
Violations on the Internet, DOT Press Release, Nov. 21, 1995
<http://www.dot.gov/cgi-bin/AT-serversearch.cgi>.
318. Oxman, supra note 46, at 277-278; Mann, supra note 83, at 34. But see RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 43, § 431(1) ("A state may employ judicial or nonjudicial measures
to induce or compel compliance or punish non-compliance with its laws or regulations,
provided it has jurisdiction to prescribe in accordance with §§ 402 and 403.").
319. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 432(2).
320. Mann, supra note 83, at 39; BROWNLE, supra note 129, at 307; WHisH, supra note
81, at 374; Federal Trade Comm. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-i-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he act of service itself constitutes an exercise of
American sovereign power within the area of the foreign country's territorial sover-
eignty.").
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much more strictly observed than is the case with jurisdiction to prescribe.
When agents of the German military secret service, MAD, observed two
persons and followed them to Austria, both Austria and Germany agreed
that the incident violated international law.321 In 1973, an Italian inspector
of finances was arrested in Switzerland for making inquiries about the
movement of contraband toward Italy.322 Two French customs officials
traveled to Switzerland on several occasions in 1980 to interrogate a for-
mer employee of a Swiss bank, requesting from him computer lists con-
taining the names, addresses, account numbers, and credit balances of
French customers. The person interrogated informed Swiss authorities, and
subsequently the French customs officials were arrested and sentenced to
• • .323
imprisonment.
An interesting question arises when the investigation is accomplished
without entering another State's territory, by running, for instance, a com-
puter program which searches databases installed in another country. At
least two different scenarios are imaginable. Police could send "dog sniffs"
324
via network to hard drives to check their contents. Or, law enforcement
agencies could try to filter the streams of e-mail communication by
searching for certain keywords,325 evaluating the communication in certain
321. Wolf Okresek, Hoheitsakte auffremdem Hoheitsgebiet-Eine Betrachtung anhand
praktischer Fdlle [Sovereign Acts in Foreign Territories-An Observation in Light of Prac-
tical Cases], 35 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFENTLICHES REcHT IUND VOLK-
ERRECHT [Aus. J. PuB. INT'L L.] 331 (1985); cf. Michael J. Glennon, Liaison and the Law:
Foreign Intelligence Agencies' Activities in the United States, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 11
(1984) ("[S]uch surveillance would seem to interfere with the sovereignty of the United
States.").
322. RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 432 reporters' n. 1.
323. Claus Schellenberg, The Proceedings Against Two French Customs Officials in
Switzerland for Prohibited Acts in Favor of a Foreign State, Economic Intelligence Service
and Violation of the Banking Law, 9 INT'L Bus. LAw. 139 (1981) (translating art. 271 para.
1 of the Swiss Penal Code as follows: "[w]hoever performs on Swiss territory without being
authorized any acts in favor of a foreign state which are reserved to a public authority or to
a public official ... whoever furthers any such acts, shall be punished with imprisonment,
in severe cases with penal servitude.").
324. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869,
882 (1996). The example comes from Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches, and
Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093
(1996).
325. See, e.g., Sabine Nuss, Die Welt Online, Staubsauger im Internet: Wie der Bundes-
nachrichtendienst das Datennetz iiberwacht [Vacuum Cleaner in the Internet: How the
German Secret Service Keeps the Data Net Under Surveillance] (March 22, 1996)
<http://www.welt.de/archiv/1996/03/22/0322deO3.htm>; see also Thomas J. Lueck, 3 Are
Arrested on Evidence From an Internet Wiretap, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995, at 42; John
Markoff, U.S. Rebuffed in Global Proposal For Eavesdropping on the Internet, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1997, at Al; Christopher Wolf & Scott Shorr, Cybercops Are Cracking
Down on Internet Fraud, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B12.
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news groups, or checking suspicious Web sites. The first scenario is dis-
tinguished from the second insofar as the objects of supervision-hard
drives-have a certain territorial location. Even though they can be easily
moved, they are like all tangibles always physically located, either within
or outside the borders of a certain jurisdiction. It is much more difficult to
locate Web sites or public bulletin boards.
Even when the location of a hard drive, a Web site, or a bulletin
board is known, the question is whether the activity of a foreign law en-
forcement agency might be allowed because the territory was not physi-
cally entered by any agent. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, Lausanne, decided
in 1982 that a violation of sovereignty did not necessarily require that the
violating person acted on the territory of the violated State.326 A German
undercover agent had contacted a Belgian suspect by telephone, inducing
him to come for a business deal to Switzerland. When the suspect arrived
in Switzerland, Germany requested his extradition.327 The Swiss Federal
Tribunal refused the extradition, arguing that to give effect to the German
request would have made Switzerland a party to the violation of which
Germany was considered guilty. This strict attitude was not shared by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Romano.32 The
appellants, domiciled in Italy, were induced by U.S. agents to come to the
United States to complete a transaction which had been negotiated and ar-
ranged by telephone conversations. Confronted with the complaint of vio-
lation of foreign sovereignty, the court followed a narrow approach. "It
must be stated at the outset that in this case no peace officer or officer of
the United States ever entered Italian territory. Therefore, there was no
violation of territorial sovereignty or offense to any State. 329
This approach, however, is too narrow. In the cases of service of sub-
poena or orders for production of documents, no government agent enters
foreign territory. Nevertheless, these cases are recognized as examples of
infringement of sovereignty. They are unilateral acts by public authorities
compelling a certain result which is not in accordance with the legal order
of the State where the effects occur. The above-mentioned telephone con-
326. X (Belgian Citizen) v. Swiss Fed. Prosecutor's Office, 10 EuGRZ 435 (Judgment
of 15 July 1982) (Swiss Federal Tribunal, Lausanne, P1201/81/fs 1983). Additionally, see
the legal opinion of Hans Schultz written on behalf of X, Male Captus, Bene Deditus?, 40
SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 93 (1984).
327. As Belgium does not extradite its own nationals, a request to Belgium would have
been senseless.
328. Romano, 706 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1983).
329. Id. at 375. Compare the position of the U.S. Government in United States v. Yunis,
681 F. Supp. 909, 916 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
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versations are arguably distinguishable. The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia made a clear and well-justified distinction between the
service of notice, which merely involves the supply of information, and
compulsory process. 330 Telephone conversations concerning fake business
deals are not compulsory by their nature. It might also be reasonable to
allow everyone, even secret services, to surf the Net.331 A search of one's
hard drive by a foreign law enforcement agency from abroad, however, has
another quality. It has the same effect as a traditional search of premises, a
law enforcement measure reserved to the territorial sovereign. Such a
"cybersearch" constitutes a unilateral act aimed at legal consequences. As
territorial sovereignty serves, inter alia, to protect the residents from
332physical persecution of other states, this protection must be extended
when persecution no longer needs to physically enter foreign territory. As
a consequence, it might be concluded that whenever a "cybersearch" tar-
gets a hard drive, a bulletin board, or a Web site in the course of a law en-
forcement measure, the consent of the territorial sovereign in which the
target is located is required. First, however, the target must be tied to a
specific foreign jurisdiction, which may not be easy in all cases involving
the Internet.
III. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
International law allows many more States to exercise jurisdiction
than a Netizen might be aware. And there is little hope that States will re-
spect the "independence of cyberspace.
333
States have already regulated the moon and other celestial bodies,
330. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont--Mousson, 636 F.2d
1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mann, supra note 83, at 39.
331. Cf. Interview with Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, German Minister of Justice, in "Der
NationaIstaat ist Oberholt" [The National State is Antiquated], DER SPIEGEL (Nov. 1996)
<http:llwww.spiegel.de/speciallheft2/schmidt-jortzig.html> [hereinafter Schmidt-Jortzig
Interview] (indicting the belief that everybody may surf the Net, but that the Secret Service
may not assume the role of a data police without statutory authorization).
332. Cf. Santiago Torres Bernardez, Territorial Sovereignty, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 487, 491 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., Instalment 10 1988).
333. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (posted Feb.
9, 1996) <http://memex.org/barlow.html>. The declaration was promulgated on February 8,
1996, surprisingly not in cyberspace, but in Davos, Switzerland. Had the Swiss authorities
taken this act seriously, Barlow might have gotten in diplomatic trouble because Switzer-
land is very strict concerning acts of foreign sovereign entities on its territory. For a com-
prehensive study of relevant Swiss practice, see DAVE SIEGRIST, HOHEITSAKTE AUF
FREMDEM STAATSGEBiET [SOVEREIGN AcTs IN FOREIGN NATIONAL TERRrrOREEs] (1987).
334. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan.
27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
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the deep seabed,335 and Antarctica.336 Although States will face seemingly
insurmountable problems in their efforts to domesticate a network of com-
puters, they will gradually find solutions.
Certain limits to the international exercise of jurisdiction, however,
are clear. Jurisdiction to prescribe, absent links of territoriality or national-
ity, is only legal under international principles if a defendant targets a State
or commits a crime to which the universality principle applies.
International jurisdiction to adjudicate is not triggered by the mere
accessibility of a Web site by a State's citizens unless the alleged Internet
crime falls under the universality exception. For instance, States are, in
general, not allowed to exercise jurisdiction over defendants located
abroad who merely advertise services over Web sites which are accessible• • •337
to their citizens without particularly targeting them. The consequences of
such expansive jurisdiction would be severe. In areas where laws differ
significantly from State to State, forum shopping could occur with a sweep
as broad as the Internet is accessible.338 Furthermore, exorbitant assertions
of jurisdiction could provoke diplomatic protests, trigger commercial or
judicial retaliation, and threaten friendly relations in unrelated fields.339
Jurisdiction to enforce by computerized means over databases or hard
drives located in foreign countries is tempered by the interests of those ter-
ritorial States. International law strongly suggests that such jurisdiction re-
quires their consent.
Traditional concepts of international law, however, will need further
development to solve future conflicts of competing jurisdictions. Consent
on abstract concepts might be reached relatively easily, but the resolution
of concrete cases will provoke troubles. International solutions, which
might help to solve cyberspace-specific problems of lack of territoriality or
abundance of territorial links, are still at a very early stage of develop-
and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
335. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, pt. XI, arts. 133-85; Annexes III and IV, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122,Dec. 10, 1982.
336. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; Convention for the Conservation
of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441; Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, May 20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476.
337. See Dale M. Cendali & James D. Arbogast, Net Use Raises Issues of Jurisdiction,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at C7. The new approach of the U.S. government is to focus on
the site of origin. Clinton & Gore, supra note 34, pt. 111.8 ("The rules of the 'country-of-
origin' should serve as the basis for controlling Internet advertising to alleviate national
legislative roadblocks and trade barriers."); cf Bauman, supra note 188, at 6.
338. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Computer Law: On-Line Legal Issues, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 15, 1995, at 3.
339. Born, supra note 45, at 29.
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ment.34
The Association of South-East Asian Nations started in March 1996
to consider plans to regulate the Net. A recent initiative of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is aiming at a
comparative study of national legislations and an exchange of experiences
on the issue of illegal content on the Internet.34' French ministry officials
are also drafting an international agreement for the OECD to regulate the
Internet.342
In October of 1996, the European Commission approved a
"Communication" on "illegal and harmful content" on the Internet as well
as a "Green Paper," which focused on "the protection of minors and hu-
man[s]" in the context of electronic services. The Communication presents
policy options for immediate action with respect to the Internet, while the
Green Paper takes a "horizontal approach" and is intended to initiate a
longer-term discussion across all electronic media. 3 The European Com-
mission identified a wide range of distinct areas concerning potentially il-
legal and harmful content on the Internet:
" national security (instructions on bomb-making, illegal drug
production, terrorist activities);
" protection of minors (abusive forms of marketing, violence, por-
nography);
" protection of human dignity (incitement to racial hatred or racial
discrimination);
o economic security (fraud, instructions on pirating credit cards);
o information security (malicious hacking);
* protection of privacy (unauthorised communication of personal
data, electronic harassment);
o protection of reputation (libel, unlawful comparative advertis-
340. See Schmidt-Jortzig Interview, supra note 331. The German Minister of Justice
sees the first step in an European Agreement on the Liability of Internet Service Provider.
The step in his view could be a worldwide convention, even though he acknowledges that
the U.S. government would never sign an agreement that outlaws Holocaust-revisionist
material. Id.
341. OECD, Inform@tion, Computer and Communications Policy (last modified Sept.
19, 1997) <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti-ict.html>. The initiative was particularly welcomed
by the Ministerial Conference. See Ministerial Conference, supra note 17, 166.
342. Ministry of Postal Services, Telecomm. and Space, Agreement on International Co-
operation with Regard to the Internet: Draft French Contribution to the Preparatory Work
for the OECD Ministerial Conference, (Oct. 23, 1996)
<http:/www.telecom.gouv.fr/englishlactiv/techno/charteint.htm>. The purposes of the pro-
posed agreement are to "better apprehend the characteristics of [the Internet], to enhance
their substantial potential, both at an economic and cultural level, and to combat illegal ac-
tivities." Id. pmbl.
343. Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet, supra note 6.
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ing);
intellectual property (unauthorised distribution of copyrighted
works, e.g. software or music)3 4
The European Commission emphasizes the importance of cooperation
among member States to combat the creation and distribution of illegal
materials on the Internet.345 At the same time, however, it proposes to ex-
tend the dialogue to international bodies composed of the largest number
of countries possible, such as the OECD, the World Trade Organization,
the United Nations, or one of the more specialized United Nations bod-
ies."
Similarly, at a conference which took place in Bonn last July, minis-
ters of twenty-nine European countries considered international coopera-
tion to be essential in this area.347 They supported a multilateral as well as a
European approach.348 The U.S. government seems to prefer a more infor-
mal dialogue with selected partners. Its new policy approach is based on
the development of an informal dialogue with key trading partners on pub-
lic policy issues such as hate speech, violation, sedition, and pornogra-
phy.349 The U.S. government is particularly concerned that different na-
tional regulations might serve as disguised trade barriers.
National solutions are necessarily more limited in their effects. Due
to the lack of authority on the international level, national approaches to
jurisdiction must use sound reasoning to convince the international corn-
munity.
350
Usenet posters, Web page editors, archive maintainers, and especially
service providers may find themselves in an unexpected legal pickle while
traveling abroad in countries with strict laws that choose to exercise juris-
diction over cyberspace broadly. They should keep in mind that the First
Amendment on the global level is nothing more than a local statute. Ac-
344. Id.
345. Id. pt. 6.1.a.
346. Id. pt. 6.3.b.
347. Ministerial Conference, supra note 17, 65.
348. Id. [66.
349. Clinton & Gore, supra note 34, pt. 1.8.
350. Civil libertarian groups, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, say it is time for a "sweeping landmark case that clarifies the
gray legal issues of cyberspace." Howard Bryant, CompuServe Stirs Debate of Censorship,
SAN JOSE MERCURY Nws, Jan 21, 1996. It is, however, not clear which court should decide
a landmark case on international jurisdiction in cyberspace. Cases like SocitJ Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522 (1987), United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), and Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) did not strengthen the reputation of the U.S. Su-
preme Court as a reliable adjudicator of international law. But see Gov't Proposes Interna-
tional Court to Deal with Internet, THE CHINA POST, May 19, 1997, at 12.
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tivities which are protected by constitutional rights in the United States
might simply be prohibited in other countries. The Net offers exposure to
many different cultures, experiences, and personalities. It offers, as well,
exposure to many different penal codes. Robust anonymity might be a
means to solve the problem of surprise legal jurisdiction-on both the na-
tional and international levels. 351' But in the meantime, the consequence for
a few keystrokes could be severe. Indeed, in a world where some countries
use harsh corporal punishments for acts they consider to be indecent, pur-
veyors of potentially obscene materials like the Thomases should be
wary-it could be worse than Tennessee and Utah.
351. Barnes, supra note 133. For the mechanics of how "anonymity" is effected over the
Internet, see, for example, A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enemies, 1995 J.
ONLrNE L. art. 4 <http://www.law.cornell.edu/jo1lfroomkin.htni>; see also A. Michael
Froomkin, It Came From the Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Cryptographic Key
"Escrow", 1996 U. Cm-. LEGAL F. 15.
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